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**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON**

W.L.

July 1, 1960

Dear Mr. Director:

The enclosed Organizational History of the National Security Council has been prepared for the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, in response to a request by its Staff Director.

Although I understand that this history will be printed under the auspices of the Senate Subcommittee, I thought that you might be interested in having an advance copy.

Sincerely yours,

James S. Lay, Jr.
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

Hon. Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

June 30, 1960

Dear Mr. Mansfield:

I am transmitting herewith the Organizational History of the National Security Council which you requested for insertion in the record of the hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery.

Robert H. Johnson, Director of the Planning Board Secretariat of the NSC Staff, and I have collaborated in writing this history. It is based upon official sources, the valued assistance of many of our associates in the NSC organization, articles by officials who have been associated with the Council, and our own recollections of events.

We have tried to make this history an authoritative and objective analysis of the organization and procedures of the Council during each of the three principal phases of its development. For each phase, there is an essentially factual description of the general organizational problems and guiding concepts, the structure of the Council and its subordinate bodies, and the procedures employed, with some indication in each case of the type of activities and of the reasons for each step in the largely evolutionary process of the Council's organizational development.

Behind this administrative accounting of the Council's development lies, of course, the substance of the national security policy problems and issues dealt with in the NSC organization by many distinguished officials over the years. These substantive problems and issues, and the individuals participating in their consideration, more than anything else have governed the nature of the Council's organization and procedures. However, as indicated in the first footnote, and consistent with the agreed guidelines for the Subcommittee's study, this history does not include the substance of any papers or discussions within the NSC organization. As also indicated, there is no individual appraisal of officials associated with the Council.

It is our earnest hope and desire that this history will prove of value to the work of the Subcommittee and, in fact, to all serious students of Government.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ James S. Lay, Jr.
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

Mr. J. Kenneth Mansfield, Staff Director
Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery
Washington 25, D. C.

AN ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION-----	1
II. THE INITIAL PHASE (SEPTEMBER 1947 - JUNE 1950)-----	5
Introduction-----	5
The Organization of the Council-----	6
The Organization of the Staff-----	10
Staff and Council Procedures-----	12
The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee-----	17
III. THE SECOND PHASE (JUNE 1950 - JANUARY 1953)-----	18
Introduction-----	18
Reorganization of the Council and the Staff-----	19
Subsequent Changes in the Council and Staff Organization-----	22
Senior Staff and Council Procedures-----	23
The Psychological Strategy Board-----	26
IV. THE THIRD PHASE (JANUARY 1953 TO THE PRESENT)-----	28
Introduction-----	28
Reorganization of the Council and the Staff-----	30
Subsequent Changes in the Organization of the Council and the Planning Board-----	35
Planning Board and Council Procedures-----	39
The Operations Coordinating Board-----	46
Origin of the OCB-----	46
Organization of the OCB-----	49
The OCB Staff-----	51
Placement of the OCB within the NSC Structure-----	52
The Work of the OCB-----	54
Changes in the NSC Staff Since July 1, 1957-----	59

June 30, 1960

AN ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL*

By James S. Lay, Jr. and Robert H. Johnson

I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

In a little less than thirteen years the National Security Council has been transformed from a brief statement of purposes in the National Security Act of 1947 into a well-established part of the governmental machinery. Two Presidents have endorsed, supported and fully utilized it. The organization and procedures of the Council have been adjusted to meet the individual needs and desires of each of the Presidents who have presided over it as well as the requirements of a changing world situation. However, the Council mechanism has also evolved continuously; each stage in its development has been built upon the stage before.

Even in advance of World War II there were individuals who saw the need for improved means of correlating our foreign policy with our military and economic capabilities. However, it was the deficiencies exposed by the pre-Pearl Harbor period of diplomatic and military maneuver, the handling of wartime problems involving relationships between foreign, military and domestic policies, and the development of policies for the postwar period that demonstrated to many individuals, in and out of government, the need for better machinery for relating our foreign and our military policies. During the wartime period General George C. Marshall is understood to have been an early advocate of improved top-level coordinating machinery.

* This history deals only with the unclassified organization and procedures of the National Security Council. It does not include the substance of papers or discussions on national security matters within the NSC organization because they are of a confidential nature involving matters of Presidential privilege and because most of them must remain classified for security reasons. Obviously, it would be inappropriate for this history to contain any individual appraisal of the many distinguished officials who have been associated with the NSC organization. However, it should be recognized that the organization and procedures described herein were largely governed by the requirements of the subject matter and of the individuals involved in the work of the Council during the various stages of its history. In fact, the purpose of the organization and procedures on which this history concentrates is to serve the officials of the Council in dealing with the substantive problems and issues affecting the security of the United States now and in the foreseeable future.

The genesis of the National Security Council has, however, many sources. One such source was U.S. wartime participation with the British in combined committees, and more particularly, our experience with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In these committees the U.S. participants became familiar with British development and use of committees and committee secretariats. In the course of their collaboration with the British, U.S. officials also became familiar with the British Committee of Imperial Defense which had been established in 1904 as a means of assuring high-level coordination of national security matters.

U.S. officials recognized that any similar U.S. organizations would have to be adapted to the requirements of the U.S. Presidential system which are, of course, in important respects different from those of the British Parliamentary system. The experience of the United States with the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization was applied during the war to the development of the organizational structure of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as to the development of the staff and sub-committee structure of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), established late in 1944 to provide a more regular channel of communication between the State Department and the U.S. military on politico-military matters.*

The "Committee of Three" which was established during World War II and subsequently abolished was, in a sense, one of the predecessors of the National Security Council. This committee was composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and was designed to facilitate consultation among these Presidential advisers on politico-military matters.

In the immediate post-war period numerous individuals and groups studied the problem and advocated some kind of high-level coordinating mechanism. One of the more comprehensive of these studies, and the first one to suggest the name "National Security Council", was the report prepared by Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt for Secretary of the Navy Forrestal in September 1945 as a result of the controversy over unification of the armed services.**

So many different individuals and organizations contributed to the development of the concept and the specific legislative proposals relating to the National Security Council that analysis of this phase of the Council's history could readily provide the basis for a separate study. It is necessary in this short history of the Council, therefore, to concentrate essentially upon developments which began with the

* SWNCC was reconstituted as the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC) following the end of the war. For discussion of the relationship of SANACC to the NSC see infra, p. 17.

** Unification of War and Navy Departments and Post-war Organization for National Security, Report to Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of Navy. (Committee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate, 79th Congress, First session), pp. 7-8, 55.

enactment of the National Security Act of 1947. Even for the period covered, this history does not pretend to be completely comprehensive, but it does attempt to cover all major developments.

The National Security Act, passed by a Republican Congress and approved by a Democratic President, is best known as the legislation that provided for "unification" of the armed services. However, it was the intent of Congress in passing the act "to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States" * and Title I of the Act provides coordinating mechanisms in three other areas of national security activity -- i. e., the areas of national security policy; of intelligence; and of military, industrial and civilian mobilization. The National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) were created to coordinate the various activities of the existing Executive departments and agencies in these three fields.**

The Act provided that the function of the Council should be to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security." It further stated that, subject to the direction of the President, the Council should:

"a. . . assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and

"b. . . consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and . . . make recommendations to the President in connection therewith."

The Central Intelligence Agency, created by the same Act, was placed under the Council.***

* National Security Act of 1947, Section 2.

** The Eberstadt report had also proposed creation of a CIA and an NSRB.

*** Section 102(a). The relationship is spelled out in Section 102(d). A predecessor organization, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), had been established on January 22, 1946 by Presidential Directive. CIG was, in September 1947, therefore a functioning organization and provided the organizational base upon which CIA was built. The Presidential Directive of 1946 also created the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) (composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and a personal representative of the President) to seek to ensure that the foreign intelligence activities of the U.S. Government were "planned, developed and coordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of

(Continued on the next page)

The Act specified that the Council should be composed of the President, Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force, and the Chairman, National Security Resources Board, but authorized the President to designate the Secretaries of executive departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board as Council members. The Act further stated that the President should preside over Council meetings, but provided that, in his absence, he might designate a member of the Council to preside in his place. Finally, the Act provided for the establishment of a career staff headed by a civilian Executive Secretary appointed by the President.

It is possible to identify three distinct phases in the Council's evolution: (a) an initial phase (September 1947-June 1950) during which the Council was organized and established itself as a useful part of the governmental machinery; (b) a second phase (June 1950-January 1953) during which the Council was reorganized in the light of operational experience and to meet the greatly increased demands placed upon it by the Korean War; and (c) a third phase (January 1953 to date) during which the Council mechanism was further strengthened and adjusted to the requirements of a new President.

the intelligence mission related to the national security". The Director of Central Intelligence, who headed CIG, performed his responsibilities "under the direction and control" of the NIA (11 Federal Register 1337-39, February 5, 1946). NIA was, in turn, closely associated with the so-called "Committee of Three" which had the same membership as NIA (except that it did not include a President's representative) but a broader role. Mr. Sidney Souers, who was named as the first Director of Central Intelligence, was subsequently the first NSC Executive Secretary.

II. THE INITIAL PHASE (SEPTEMBER 1947-JUNE 1950)

Introduction

Those who participated in the initial organization and work of the Council were motivated by certain key principles. Central to everything else was their recognition of and emphasis upon the Council's role as a policy advisory body to the President.

At the time the Council was organized there were some within the Executive Branch who favored a somewhat different emphasis. They did not deny that the Council was fundamentally an advisory body to the President. But they believed that when, in the absence of the President, there was consensus within the Council on a particular matter; when the departments or agencies represented on the Council were able to carry out the decision reached; and when that decision was within the scope of previously approved Presidential policies, it would not be necessary to take the matter to the President for decision.

It was decided, however, that the Council's role should be limited strictly to advising the President. The advisory character of the Council was the principal theme of a statement of the "Concept" of the Council approved by the President in July 1948.* The only qualification placed upon this proposition was the recognition that, under the statute, the Council members had certain corporate responsibilities for issuing general directives concerning the organization and coordination of such foreign intelligence activities of the several government departments and agencies as relate to the national security. Even this is not truly an exception, for the President retains the ultimate power of decision within the Executive Branch.

Corollary to this emphasis upon the advisory character of the Council was the acceptance of the principle that divergencies of view as to national security policy should not be suppressed, but should be clearly reflected at each stage in the development of a policy. This principle has been applied to the Council's work throughout its history and regularly resulted in presentation to the President of what have come to be known as "split" policy recommendations.

Within the broad and basic concept as to the advisory character of the Council, the officials responsible for organizing the Council's work faced certain immediate practical decisions as to what kinds of problems should be tackled first. The Council's functions, as stated in the statute, were very broad indeed. It was believed, however, that the Council could most quickly establish itself as an organization of recognized usefulness to the President and to the departments and agencies if, initially, instead of concentrating on some of the broader, longer-range national security problems, it were to make

* The immediate occasion for the preparation of the "Concept" was an appearance by the Executive Secretary before a Hoover Commission Task Force. However, it was based upon and codified similar statements that had been made upon earlier occasions.

itself available to the Council agencies for the development of policies to deal with problems which were of immediate, current concern to those agencies and which required Presidential decision. Finally, it was recognized that the Council was likely, under the circumstances existing at that time, to be concerned in very considerable measure with problems involving foreign affairs and that, accordingly, the State Department would play a major role within the organization.*

The Organization of the Council

The National Security Act of 1947 was approved by the President on July 26, 1947. Mr. Sidney Souers, the Executive Secretary Designate, began assembling a small permanent Council Staff in August.** The Council held its first meeting on the effective date of the Act, Friday, September 26, 1947. Mr. Souers was sworn in as Executive Secretary just prior to the meeting, together with the heads of two other new agencies established by the Act, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman, National Security Resources Board.

Certain basic organizational decisions were made at the first meeting of the Council. It was decided that the permanent membership should be restricted to those officials specified by the Act and that attendance of other officials would be only with the approval of the presiding officer. The heads of other agencies were regularly invited for items of interest to them.*** It was agreed that the Director of Central Intelligence should attend all Council meetings as an adviser and observer. It was decided that no set schedule of meetings should be established, but that meetings should be arranged as required. The Council at this inaugural meeting also approved recommendations of the Executive Secretary, developed in consultation with the participating agencies, with respect to the functions and composition of the NSC Staff and with respect to the initial study assignment to the Staff. It was agreed that CIA should initially furnish necessary administrative services to the NSC (e. g., fiscal, personnel and supply services).

* On this last point see Sidney W. Souers, "Policy Formulation and National Security". The American Political Science Review Vol. XLIII, No. 3 (June 1949) p. 536.

** On the day the Council held its first meeting the Council had, in addition to the Executive Secretary, three employees, all detailed by participating agencies. One of these was the present Executive Secretary, Mr. James S. Lay, Jr..

*** It would not be useful to list for the period 1946-50, or for subsequent periods covered in this history, all of the other officials who participated in Council meetings on an ad hoc basis. However, it may be of interest to note that the following participated on this basis during the period September 1947 to December 1948: The Secretaries of Treasury, Commerce and Labor; the Attorney General; the Economic Cooperation Administrator and the Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board.

Although President Truman presided at the first Council meeting and occasional meetings thereafter, he did not regularly attend such meetings until the beginning of the Korean War.* The President's decision not to attend Council meetings was based upon his concern that the discussion might be terminated prematurely by too early an expression of his own views** and upon his view that in this way he could best preserve his full freedom of action with respect to the policy recommendations of the Council, including any dissents thereto.

There were those who argued that, in view of the statement in the statute that "The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security", he should preside in the President's absence.*** However, the President decided that the Secretary of State, as the second ranking member of the Council as then constituted, would preside. This decision was also consistent with the concept that, under the circumstances then existing, the State Department would play a major role in the organization.

The Council's recommendations were brought to the President for his consideration following the meeting, ordinarily by the Executive Secretary who served, in effect, as an Administrative Assistant to the President for national security matters. The President was kept regularly informed of the status of Council business through regular briefings by the Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary saw the President daily to brief him on the latest foreign intelligence as well as on Council matters.**** Even though the President did not regularly preside, Council meetings were, from the beginning, held in the Cabinet Room of The White House.

During this period certain changes occurred in the initial arrangements regarding meetings and Council participation. In May 1948 the Council agreed that meetings should be regularly scheduled twice a month. However, a meeting might be cancelled if there was no business to transact and special meetings might be scheduled as required. These rules prevailed until the beginning of the Korean War. Two significant changes in membership occurred in the period. In January 1949 the President directed that the Secretary of the Treasury attend all Council meetings. On August 19, 1949, the President approved amendments to the National Security Act which created the Department of Defense as

* President Truman presided at twelve of the 57 Council meetings which were held during the period from September 26, 1947 through June 23, 1950.

** Souers, op. cit p. 541.

*** National Security Act of 1947, Section 202 (a). In 1949 this section was amended to provide that "The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense".

**** With the retirement of Admiral William H. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President, on March 26, 1949, the Executive Secretary assumed full responsibility for briefing the President daily on politico-military affairs, a task he had previously performed in cooperation with Admiral Leahy.

an Executive Department and greatly strengthened the position of the Secretary of Defense giving him clear primacy over the Service Secretaries.* These amendments also eliminated the Service Secretaries from the Council membership and added the Vice President. The same amendments made the Joint Chiefs of Staff military advisers to the Council. The Chairman, JCS, thereafter attended all Council meetings. By Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1949, effective August 20, 1949, the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the President, thus formalizing a de facto situation.**

A Council staff and committee structure to deal with U. S. internal security problems was developed as a result of Council action initiated in April 1948. At that time the Council employed Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, former Chief of the Internal Security Division of the FBI, as a consultant. Mr. Coyne, who was recommended to the Council by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, undertook at the Council's request a survey of the problem of internal security. His report, submitted to the Council in August, concluded that a more thoroughly coordinated and integrated effort was required in this field. To this end, he proposed creation of a Special Assistant on Internal Security to the National Security Council who would be charged with responsibility for making an assessment and appraisal of the over-all internal security program on a continuing basis and who would arrange through interested agencies for studies of particular internal security problems with a view to developing agreed solutions to such problems. In carrying out this function this individual was to work closely on a consultative, advisory and mutually cooperative basis with the representatives of the interested Executive departments and agencies. The Council adopted the conclusions of this report, but deferred action on the recommendation with respect to a Special Assistant.

After further consideration of the problem the NSC in March 1949 approved a directive establishing the already existent Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) as a committee of the NSC and creating a new Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS).*** Specific charters for the two

* Public Law 216, 81st Congress.

** The Council offices were from the beginning located in the Executive Office Building. There were those who, at the time the Council was getting organized, favored locating Council offices in the Pentagon. In fact, office space was provided for the Executive Secretary in the Pentagon, but never occupied. The decision to locate the Council offices in the Executive Office Building reflected a conscious recognition of the Council's role as a staff arm to the President.

*** At the time it was established as a committee of the NSC, the IIC was made up of Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice; the Director of the Intelligence Division of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; and the Director, Office of Special Investigations, U. S. Air Force. The membership today is the same except that the title of the Army representative is now "Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army" and, of the Air Force representative, "Director of Special Investigations, the Inspector General, Headquarters U. S. Air Force". The ICIS was, and continues to be, composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice and the National Military Establishment (now, the Department of Defense).

committees were approved subsequently by the Council. The IIC was already responsible for the coordination of the investigation of all domestic espionage, counter-espionage, sabotage, subversion and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security. The ICIS was made responsible for co-ordination of all other internal security matters.

The directive of March 1949 also created an NSC Representative on Internal Security who, under the direction of the Executive Secretary, was responsible for (a) assisting and advising the NSC in coordinating the activities of the IIC and the ICIS; (b) assisting and advising the IIC and the ICIS in carrying out their responsibilities; (c) submitting to the IIC and the ICIS questions which, in his opinion, required their consideration; (d) participating, as the representative of the NSC, as an observer and adviser in all meetings of the IIC and the ICIS; (e) submitting for NSC consideration any problems which could not be resolved by the IIC and the ICIS, outlining divergent solutions proposed and making his own recommendation; and (f) reporting to the NSC at least quarterly on progress being made in the provision of adequate internal security. It was specified, however, that he should have no power of instruction, direction or supervision over the IIC or the ICIS. Mr. Coyne was designated as the NSC Representative on Internal Security.

When, acting within its Presidentially-approved charter, either of the committees reached an agreement on a particular course of action, that agreement could be referred to the appropriate agency for implementation without prior reference of the matter to the NSC. The NSC Representative on Internal Security sought to ensure that matters that did appear to require Council action were brought to the Council's attention. The Council was kept regularly informed of the committees' activities through reports on those activities.

Beginning with this initial period and thereafter throughout its history, the Council has from time to time established other standing committees or sub-committees. Such standing committees occasionally include members from non-Council agencies. However, they have characteristically been created to deal with some particularly sensitive subject or with a subject of direct interest to only a few of the agencies that participate in the Council's work.*

* It may be useful here to compare the recommendations of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (the "Hoover Commission") regarding the NSC with the organizational changes described above. The Hoover Commission in 1949 recommended inter alia: (a) that the President be given authority to determine the membership of the Council; (b) that better working level relationships be established between the JCS organization and the NSC and other agencies; (c) that internal security planning be improved; (d) that CIA be improved and strengthened; and (e) that the Council be placed formally within the President's Office. The 1949 statutory changes helped ease some of the immediate problems with respect to membership by limiting the military establishment to a single Council representative. The statutory change with respect to the JCS relationship to the Council eased, but did not completely solve, the problem referred to in (b); further organizational changes effected in 1950 did, however, largely solve this problem (infra, p. 22). The surveys of internal security and
(Continued on the next page)

The Organization of the Staff

A major consideration in the initial organization of the Council's staff was stated as follows by the first Executive Secretary of the Council:

"In organizing the staff, an effort has been made to steer a middle course between two undesirable extremes. If the personnel were entirely composed of permanent Council employees, there would be a tendency to reach 'ivory tower' conclusions out of step with operational developments. On the other hand, if the personnel were solely officers detailed from the participating departments, unavoidable turnover might cause a loss of continuity. The staff, therefore, is a mixture of these two types.*"

That part of the staff organization drawn from the agencies that participate in the Council's work has, throughout the Council's history, performed two basic functions. On the one hand, the individuals who comprise this part of the staff have been individually responsible for bringing the resources of their respective departments and agencies to bear upon the Council's work. On the other hand, these individuals have, as a group, prepared the papers considered by the Council. The permanent career staff of the Council has provided certain central services and has been a source of independent analysis of the subjects before the Council and its subordinate interdepartmental staff groups.

The Council Staff, as initially organized, had three principal components: (a) the Office of the Executive Secretary; (b) a Secretariat which performed such usual secretariat duties as circulating papers, preparing agenda and recording Council actions; and (c) a unit called "The Staff" which developed studies and policy recommendations for Council consideration. The office of the Executive Secretary and the Secretariat were composed entirely of permanent Council employees. "The Staff", on the other hand, initially consisted wholly of officials detailed on a full-time basis by the departments and agencies represented on the Council, though it was assisted by permanent staff members. Because, as earlier noted, it was anticipated that the majority of problems dealt with by the Council under then-existing conditions would relate primarily to foreign affairs, the State Department was asked to provide an official to head this Staff. This official was called the "Coordinator of the Staff". In December, 1947, a permanent Council employee was added to "The Staff". Obtained by permanent transfer from State, he was designated "Assistant to the Coordinator". Immediately following the first Council meeting, full-time members of "The Staff" were designated by State, Army,

intelligence activities (on the latter see infra, pp. 12-13), which had already been undertaken by the Council, together with the Council actions flowing therefrom, covered the matters mentioned in (c) and (d). Placement of the NSC in the Executive Office of the President dealt with the recommendation referred to in (e).

* Souers, op cit, p. 537.

Navy, Air Force and CIA. The State Staff Member was not initially the same individual as the "Coordinator". The Secretary of Defense, who was not at this time represented on "The Staff", designated a Special Assistant to maintain liaison with the Executive Secretary. Because it was itself in process of organization during this period, the NSRB did not designate a Staff member until February 1948. Non-members of the Council were represented at meetings of "The Staff" on an ad hoc basis when subjects of concern to them were being considered. Members of "The Staff" were generally of the rank of lieutenant colonel or colonel (Navy: commander or captain) or equivalent Civil Service rank; the Coordinator was a senior Foreign Service Officer.

It might be noted here that the changes that have occurred during the life of the Council in the terminology applied to the different parts of the Council staff organization have been a source of some confusion to those outside the organization. Thus initially, as indicated, the term "The Staff" was applied to the principal interdepartmental component of "The NSC Staff".* Following the 1950 reorganization the interdepartmental components, the "Senior NSC Staff" and the "Staff Assistants", were formally still considered a part, along with the permanent career staff, of "The NSC Staff". However, in practice it became customary to apply the latter term to the permanent career staff only. This practice was formalized at the time of the 1953 reorganization.

In November 1947 a fourth component was added to the Council staff structure. As a result of a meeting of the Four Secretaries (Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force) attended by Mr. Souers, the chiefs of the plans and operations divisions in the three military services were designated "Consultants" to the Executive Secretary. The Secretary of State similarly agreed to designate the Chief of the Policy Planning Staff as the State Consultant to Mr. Souers. A Consultant was named by NSRB in June 1948, and the Director of Central Intelligence performed this function for CIA. In addition, the Secretary of Defense designated the Director of the Joint Staff to advise the Executive Secretary. Although a number of important changes have been made in the Council staff organization since 1947, the basic pattern of a two-level interagency staff organization, established in 1947, has persisted down to the present day.

Only relatively minor changes occurred in this staff organization during the period under review. In April 1949, after Mr. Louis Johnson became Secretary of Defense, he named a Member for "The Staff" and formally designated the Director of the Joint Staff as his NSC Consultant. The position of State Member of "The Staff" and the position of the Coordinator of "The Staff" were combined in July 1949. After the National Security Act was amended in August 1949, the three members of "The Staff" from the military services were redesignated "Advisers" and the representative of the Secretary of Defense became the sole member from the Defense Department. The Service Advisers continued, however, to participate fully in the work of "The Staff".

* Hereafter when reference is made to this interdepartmental staff component of the 1947-50 period, it will be identified as "The Staff" in quotation marks.

Staff and Council Procedures

Something of the character of the problems with which the Council was concerned during this period, as well as during subsequent periods, may be suggested by a brief description of the four principal categories of policy papers considered by the Council. First and most important are the basic over-all policy papers which cover a wide range of national security problems and contain related political, economic and military strategy. Second are the papers covering individual foreign countries or larger geographical regions. A third category might be called "functional" policies. These cover such national security policy matters as mobilization, atomic energy, Free World-Sino-Soviet Bloc trade, and regulation and control of armaments. Organizational policies constitute the final category. These include, among others, policies relating to the Council's own organization, internal security organization and the general policy directives relating to the organization and coordination of foreign intelligence activities which are issued by the Council pursuant to the National Security Act.

The Council at its first meeting, on the recommendation of the Executive Secretary, made the assessment of U. S. objectives, commitments and risks in relation to actual and potential U. S. power a continuing, long-range study assignment of the NSC Staff. However, in accordance with the basic approach described earlier, it was decided very early that this assignment should be tackled initially through studies of certain critical areas of the world. It was agreed that these studies should subsequently be incorporated in an over-all appraisal of U. S. objectives, commitments and risks.

During much of the period 1947-50, therefore, the great majority of the policies considered by the Council were policies dealing with particular foreign countries or larger geographical regions which presented problems of critical significance at the time. Initially papers of this kind were focused on single (though major) problems and in some cases provided quite detailed policy guidance for dealing with those problems. Papers dealing with a single foreign country did not attempt to deal with all aspects of U. S. relations with the country, but only with certain key aspects. However, as the months and years passed the Council and its staff progressively tackled broader, longer-range problems and broadened the scope and coverage of country and regional policy papers. The first paper of a broad over-all character dealing with the basic national security problems facing the United States was adopted by the Council in November 1948.

In this initial phase of the Council's existence relatively few policies of the "functional" variety were acted upon by the Council. However, because the Council was establishing many of its basic organizational arrangements during this period and was also making recommendations for organizational change in areas of governmental activity related to the Council's work, organizational policies constituted an important proportion of the Council's business. For example, the Council began in December 1947 to discharge its responsibilities under the National Security Act for issuing general policy directives concerning the organization and coordination of such foreign intelligence activities of the several departments and agencies as relate to the national security. In January 1948 the Council initiated a general survey of foreign intelligence

activities. This survey was made by a group of consultants from outside the government and marks the first such use of outside consultants by the Council.* The recommendations made by this survey group were subsequently considered in the Council.

Some reorientation was given to the work of the Council and "The Staff" when, on May 4, 1949, not long after the beginning of President Truman's second Administration, the Executive Secretary met with the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of the Policy Planning Staff and other State Department officials to discuss the work of the Staff, and, in particular, the type of reports that the Staff had been preparing. On the basis of the conclusions reached in that discussion, the Executive Secretary on May 26 issued instructions to the Coordinator of "The Staff" requesting "The Staff" (a) to conduct a periodical review of all current national security policies in order to determine what revisions were necessary; and (b) to undertake a program of studies on major policy problems which would appraise the national security aspects of those problems and analyze alternative courses of action open to the United States, without, however, making policy recommendations. These instructions thus initiated two new types of staff activity--a general review of existing policies, and the preparation of papers which discussed policy alternatives without recommending a particular policy.** Both types of activity have been a recurrent feature of Council business in the period since 1949.

From the beginning, proposals for Council projects could and did originate in a variety of different ways. In the first year of the Council's operation, for example, State was the most important single source of the Council's agenda subjects but the Secretary of Defense, the Army and the Air Force together originated nearly as many Council projects. In fact, a striking feature of the Council's early activities was the leading role which the late Mr. Forrestal played in initiating Council projects during the period that he was Secretary of Defense. The NSC Staff, the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee,*** CIA and Commerce were other sources of projects during the first year.

Members of "The Staff", though assigned to the Council on a full-time basis and physically located together in the NSC offices, also maintained offices in, and regular contact with, their respective agencies. Meetings of "The Staff" were conducted on an informal basis with the Coordinator serving as chairman. The first step in the preparation of a paper was a meeting of "The Staff" to discuss the policy problem and to define the scope of the particular report. Although the principal participants in these Staff discussions were the members detailed by the agencies, certain members of the permanent career staff also participated. While the latter did not make policy recommendations, they did raise questions, suggest additional issues, and often prepared redrafts of papers on the basis of the Staff discussions.

* One of the members of this survey group was Mr. Allen W. Dulles, the present Director of Central Intelligence.

** The review of policies was undertaken immediately; the first Staff report analyzing policy alternatives was discussed in the Council in August 1949.

*** On the relationships between the Council and SANACC see infra, p. 17.

Each Staff member obtained the staff-level views of his respective department or agency with respect to the matter under review. These views were sometimes submitted in writing. After one or more Staff discussions, in the course of which the agencies represented on "The Staff" further clarified their views on the subject, one member of "The Staff" was ordinarily requested to prepare a draft report. In the usual case, the first draft of the report was prepared by the State Department member. As a variant of this procedure, utilized particularly in the early days of the Council, the members of "The Staff" were requested to prepare individual agency contributions which were subsequently integrated into a single report.

The usual policy paper prepared by "The Staff" during this period consisted of three basic elements: (a) a very brief and quite general statement of the problem to which the paper was addressed; (b) an analysis of the problem; and (c) conclusions. The analysis normally included such elements as a statement of U. S. objectives, a statement of existing policies and commitments, an estimate of the situation and possible future developments, and an analysis of the alternative courses of action open to the United States. The "Conclusions" were the only section of the paper normally acted upon by the Council. The paper as a whole was ordinarily very brief.

After several meetings of "The Staff" on a policy draft, it was sent to the Consultants for concurrences. The Consultants were not requested to concur in a paper in all of its particulars, but only to indicate their views as to whether the paper was in such condition as to be suitable for Council consideration. Although ordinarily these concurrences were obtained without a meeting of the Consultants, meetings were occasionally called by the Executive Secretary, particularly when there was a difference of view among the Consultants. Following such clearance, the paper, including any continuing divergences of view, was submitted to the Council for its consideration.* The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were obtained by the Secretary of Defense on any papers having military implications and were circulated to the Council prior to its consideration of the paper.

Ordinarily the policy proposals acted upon by the Council were prepared by "The Staff". In these cases where a Council member submitted a policy proposal directly to the Council for consideration, it was usually referred, sometimes after preliminary Council discussion, to "The Staff" for preparation of a report and recommendations. Nonetheless, there were a number of instances in which the Council acted directly upon a report submitted by one of its members (generally the Secretary of State). Upon occasion the Secretary of State submitted reports for the information, rather than for the consideration, of the Council. Such reports, stating the current U. S. foreign policy position on some subject, were often discussed in Council meetings and were occasionally concurred in by the Council and the President.**

* The first policy paper prepared by "The Staff" was submitted to the Council in mid-October, 1947, and considered and adopted in November. Since this paper was prepared before there were Consultants, it went directly to the Council.

** Souers, op cit, p. 539.

One of the features of the latter part of the period under review was the increasing use by the Council of ad hoc committees to prepare reports for its consideration. Such committees were generally, at least in original membership, composed of higher-level agency representatives than was "The Staff". They often included representatives of agencies which were not regularly represented on "The Staff". Ad hoc committees were assigned responsibility for recommending policies on some of the more critical problems during the latter part of this period.

The Council agenda from the start included a variety of different types of report. Some were submitted for consideration as the basis for policy recommendations to the President. Others were submitted solely for Council information though, when scheduled on a Council agenda, they might provoke a Council discussion. Some reports were specifically designed to serve as the basis for Council discussion. Some Council papers were submitted by Council members, some by "The Staff", some by non-members of the Council, and others by special committees or by consultants. In some instances these were regular periodic reports, in other cases they were prepared in response to specific request or because of some development or anticipated development. The agenda also included both oral and written reports.

Certain regular reports were a standing feature of the Council agendas. Thus in the first year of the Council's existence a written current intelligence report was regularly placed on the agenda for the Council's information. Subsequently this report was submitted and scheduled monthly. In 1950 it was dropped altogether as an agenda item. Instead, the Director of Central Intelligence would from time to time in the course of Council discussion call the Council's attention to intelligence information which had a bearing on the policy papers under consideration or which was otherwise of interest to the Council. Beginning in May 1948 a report prepared by the NSC Secretariat on the current status of work on Council and Staff projects also became a regular agenda item.

In the Council meeting, the Executive Secretary introduced each subject on the agenda, but generally did not attempt to summarize the contents of the reports before the Council on the assumption that each participant had done his "homework" in advance. The presiding officer was sometimes the first to comment upon a policy paper; on other occasions he called first upon the other Council members for comment. A general discussion of the policy paper followed.

A decision was made at the beginning of the Council's existence not to prepare written minutes which would reflect the Council discussion. It was believed that to do so would have an undesirable inhibiting effect upon the discussion. Therefore, throughout the Council's history, the only permanent official record that has been made is a record of the Council's action on the various subjects it has considered. During the period 1947-53, this record was prepared by the Executive Secretary on the basis of his understanding of the Council's actions, but was not normally circulated to the Council members for clearance in advance of its submission to the President. Council members could, of course, raise questions as to the Executive Secretary's interpretation of what had occurred in the meeting, following circulation of the approved record. Such action was seldom taken, however.

It should be noted that occasionally, when it did not appear necessary to have a formal Council discussion of a report, the Council acted upon it by memorandum approval. This practice, originating in the earliest months of the Council's activity, continues to the present though it is used infrequently.

A day or two after the Council meeting the Executive Secretary submitted to the President the record of the Council's actions and the policy papers as amended and adopted by the Council, including any remaining differences of view. He also submitted any Joint Chiefs of Staff views on the paper. The President acted upon the Council's recommendations, deciding any remaining differences of view. The President approved only the "Conclusions" of the policy paper; these became the national security policy on the subject.

Following the President's action upon them, the record of the Council's actions and the approved policy papers were circulated to all Council participants. From the beginning, when the President approved policy recommendations submitted to him by the Council, he directed that they be implemented "by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government under the coordination" of the department or agency head who had the primary responsibility for implementation of the policy involved. In most cases this was the Secretary of State. The head of a department or agency which had been assigned responsibility by the President for implementation of a Council action or for the coordination of implementation of a policy paper was informed of his responsibility by individual memorandum from the Executive Secretary. It was the responsibility of the coordinating agency to notify all other departments and agencies of the actions for which each was responsible in implementation of the paper, and to ensure that such actions were taken in a coordinated manner. The coordinating agency was also responsible for ensuring appropriate dissemination of the policy, or extracts from it, to agencies of the government which were not members of the NSC.

The Council in 1948 established an ad hoc committee to re-examine procedures for the implementation of national security policies. That committee recommended, and the Council in October 1948 approved, continuation of existing procedures with the additional provision that the "coordinating agency" would submit progress reports at appropriate intervals which summarized the implementation of the policy. These reports were circulated to the Council for its information and scheduled on the agenda of a Council meeting. Thus an opportunity was provided for discussion at the Council level of the implementation of approved policies. Progress reports were quite brief (generally no more than one or two single-spaced pages). They sometimes reported on implementation on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis but initially there was no standard format. In the early period they were sometimes submitted as frequently as every month or two, though four to six months was the more usual time period.

Subsequently the instructions relating to the implementation of national security policies were amended to provide further that, if the coordinating agency and another participating agency differed as to interpretation of the policy or as to methods of implementation and were unable to resolve their differences, the divergent views would be submitted in writing through the Executive Secretary to the President for his decision.

The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee

In late 1944, as noted earlier, there had been established, by agreement between the Secretaries concerned, a State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). When the Air Force was established as a separate department by the National Security Act of 1947 it was added to the membership of the committee and the committee was re-christened the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC). Although SANACC dealt with a broad range of problems, those relating to occupied areas constituted its most important single field of activity.

Soon after the Council was organized SANACC began to submit policy papers to it for its consideration. These were generally referred to the Staff for revision following preliminary Council consideration. Occasionally the Council in turn requested SANACC to prepare a report for it. The Executive Secretary of the Council maintained regular contact with the secretariat of SANACC and received SANACC papers. In this way, duplication of effort was avoided. However, it was evident that SANACC's functions closely paralleled, if they did not indeed in many respects duplicate, the functions of the NSC Staff.* An important difference (and one of the reasons that SANACC was temporarily continued) was the fact that, unlike the Council or its staff, it could, through action by its members, initiate implementation of its decisions, provided, of course, that the subject was within its terms of reference and that Presidential consideration was not required.**

An ad hoc committee of the Council was established in March 1948 to study the relationship between SANACC and the Council. That committee proposed interim terms of reference for SANACC which the Council approved in August 1948. Those terms of reference provided that SANACC's principal functions would be (a) to advise and assist the NSC, preparing reports and studies requested by it; and (b) to coordinate matters referred to SANACC by any of its members or by the NSC. Thus SANACC was, in effect, recognized as being a part of the Council's staffing mechanism while at the same time it continued to perform coordinating functions on matters which did not come before the Council.

In accordance with the interim terms of reference, the Council made a further review of SANACC six months after approval of the terms of reference. That review resulted in action by the Council to dissolve SANACC as of June 30, 1949.

* The Eberstadt report had recommended that the NSC take over the functions of SWNCC (op cit p. 7; see pp. 53-54 of that report for a brief description of SWNCC organization and activities).

** In this respect SANACC was somewhat similar in character to the internal security committees of the Council established in 1949 and to the Operations Coordinating Board established in 1953.

III. THE SECOND PHASE (June 1950-January 1953)

Introduction

Though by the time of the Korean War the Council was a well-established, functioning organization, certain problems relating to the initial organizational arrangements began to become apparent. Attendance at the Council meetings, originally confined to the Council members themselves, gradually broadened to include the Consultants and other departmental advisers. This tended at times to have an inhibiting effect upon discussion and to result in undue reliance by Council members upon departmental advisers during the Council discussion. The absence of the President from the Council table, though it had been thought desirable for certain reasons noted earlier, tended to produce a less sharply focused discussion than if the President had been present, and action on important points at issue was sometimes deferred or was taken later outside the Council. Though the Council discussion was subsequently summarized for the President by the Executive Secretary, the President's absence from the meeting deprived him of the opportunity of hearing the Council members' direct expression of their own views, and of the opportunity to ask questions and to engage personally in the interchange of views around the Council table. Council members, lacking an opportunity to present their respective positions directly to the President in Council meetings, sometimes took occasion to do so individually following the meeting.

Moreover, detailed members of "The Staff", working as a group in the NSC staff offices, tended increasingly to be looked upon as "foreigners" by their respective agencies. On the other hand, the Consultants, all of whom had heavy departmental responsibilities, tended over time to give less and less attention to NSC matters. These tendencies toward the isolation of "The Staff" members from their agencies and toward the increased absorption of the Consultants in agency work produced two additional results: (a) the tendency of Council members to submit policy recommendations directly to the Council, by-passing "The Staff"; and (b) the tendency of the Council to refer many problems to ad hoc Council committees.

Experience had shown that direct referral of departmental papers to the Council, without joint staff work, led generally to delay. In the absence of such staff work which exposed pertinent facts, viewpoints and alternative policies and which clearly defined the issues in advance of the Council meeting, the Council generally found it necessary to refer such papers to "The Staff" or to an ad hoc committee for interdepartmental staffing prior to final Council action.

Ad hoc committees were sometimes a useful and occasionally a notably successful device, but regular referral of problems to such committees often also delayed work unduly. Such delays were the results of such factors as (a) the heavy departmental responsibilities of many of the members of such committees; (b) the difficulties such committees have in arranging meetings and meeting deadlines (contrasted with staff groups that have regular, fixed meeting times and work programs); (c) the unfamiliarity of many of the members of such groups with Council requirements as to substance, format and procedure; and (d) finally, and most important, the frequent inability of such committees to relate their

work on a particular policy problem to other pertinent approved national security policies. Ad hoc committee members also tended to approach problems primarily as representatives of their respective agencies.

Another problem was the lack of a Joint Chiefs of Staff representative on "The Staff". This lack made it very difficult to anticipate and take into account probable JCS views on a subject under discussion in advance of receipt of their formal written views. Such views, which were submitted only after staff work had been completed and the paper circulated to the Council for consideration, frequently required referral of the paper back to "The Staff" for reconsideration.

A final problem related to the chairmanship of the Council's major interdepartmental staff groups. As noted earlier, the State Department was from the beginning assigned a major role in the Council because of State's leading role in foreign affairs and because of the expectation that the Council's major concerns would be in the foreign affairs field. As an application of this principle, a State representative had been made Coordinator (chairman) of "The Staff". As the Council developed, the matters which were of concern to it gradually broadened to include many problems which did not relate solely or even primarily to foreign affairs, though many of these problems had important foreign affairs aspects, e. g., military, defense mobilization, internal security and atomic energy problems. This gradual development was accelerated by the beginning of hostilities in Korea, which increased the importance and urgency of military and defense mobilization problems and the role of the military and defense mobilization representatives in the Council organization. In other words, while the majority of the policy papers with which the Council continued to be concerned were papers dealing with foreign affairs and while the State Department continued to play the major role in the development of these policy papers, the number of subjects involving direct, major responsibilities of other departments and agencies increased and with it, their role. In these changed circumstances the dual role of the State Coordinator of "The Staff", as an impartial chairman and as advocate of a State Department position, became increasingly difficult. Over time the feeling grew that other departments and agencies would cooperate more effectively in the work of the Council in matters directly affecting their own responsibilities if the major interdepartmental staff groups were chaired by someone without departmental ties. Finally, and of great importance, was the recognition that the work of the interdepartmental staff group which prepared reports for the NSC could be fully effective in serving the Council only if the chairman of the group was personally cognizant, through regular contact with the President, of his desires and requirements regarding the work of the Council.

Reorganization of the Council and the Staff

All of these problems had been under consideration for some time by the Executive Secretary and others associated with the organization. They were provided with an opportunity to do something about them in connection with a general review of basic U. S. security policies in the winter and spring of 1950 which produced, as an early by-product, a general recommendation for a revised and strengthened staff organization. In response to

this recommendation, the Executive Secretary* on April 17, 1950, submitted his proposals for the reconstitution and strengthening of the NSC Staff. He proposed the creation of a senior staff group composed of one representative designated by each Council member, with a military adviser designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and an intelligence adviser designated by the Director of Central Intelligence. In addition, other agency heads invited by the President to participate in Council work might, when appropriate, designate an ad hoc representative on this staff. The members of this senior staff group were to be individuals who could fully and accurately reflect the views of their principals and were to have such departmental status and freedom from other duties as to permit them to devote a large part of their time to Council work. The existing Staff members were to become assistants to the senior staff group so as to take full advantage of their experience and background and to ease the transition to the new organization.

One objection that was soon raised to these proposals related to the matter of JCS representation. It was argued that it was impossible for an individual "adviser" to represent a corporate body like the Joint Chiefs of Staff in such a staff organization.

In May 1950 the whole problem was referred by the Council to a special NSC committee, consisting of representatives of State, Defense, and NSRB, for the preparation, in collaboration with the Executive Secretary, of appropriate recommendations. However, the Korean hostilities began before the committee was ready to submit its report. Immediately following the beginning of the Korean War, President Truman began presiding regularly at all Council meetings except for occasional instances when he was unable to attend.** In those instances the Secretary of State presided. At about this same time the President directed that the Council meet regularly every Thursday and that all important recommendations relating to national security policy be coordinated through the Council and its staff.

On July 19, 1950, the President issued a directive with respect to the reorganization and strengthening of the Council and its staff. Once more he emphasized that all major national security policies should be recommended to him through the Council. He directed that Council attendance be restricted to the statutory members of the Council plus the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman, JCS, the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. W. Averell Harriman (Special Assistant to the President), Mr. Souers, and the Executive Secretary. He further directed that participation of other officials be only with his specific approval. He requested the Secretaries of State

* Mr. Souers resigned as Executive Secretary effective January 15, 1950, and was succeeded by Mr. Lay. Mr. Souers was appointed a Special Consultant to the President and continued to attend all Council meetings until January 1953.

** President Truman presided at 62 (or 87%) of the 71 Council meetings held from June 28, 1950, through January 9, 1953.

and Defense, the Chairman, NSRB, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence each to nominate a member for a senior staff group. The President himself designated the members of the senior staff group on the basis of these nominations. Finally, he named the Executive Secretary, NSC, chairman of the senior staff group.

Members of the senior staff group, or the "Senior NSC Staff" as it was soon called, were quickly nominated and, at the Senior Staff meeting on August 11, 1950, they in turn designated their assistants. Shortly thereafter Mr. Harriman also nominated a representative for the Senior Staff. Mr. Marion W. Boggs, a member of the career NSC Staff and former Assistant to the Coordinator of the Staff, was named Coordinator (*i. e.*, chairman) of the Staff Assistants. He also served as the executive secretary of the Senior Staff. The functions of these two interdepartmental staff groups continued to be those functions that the Council had assigned "The Staff" at the first Council meeting in 1947. On August 10, 1950, the Council directed that the Senior Staff assume responsibility for projects formerly assigned to ad hoc committees of the Council.

These changes were directed toward solving the problems noted above. The relationship between the changes in Council arrangements and the problems noted earlier is obvious and direct. The relationship between the changes and the problems at the staff level needs some elaboration, however. At the senior level the agency representatives on the Senior Staff were drawn much more fully and actively into the work of the Council than their predecessors, the Consultants. Whereas the Consultants had played a largely passive role, the Senior Staff replaced "The Staff" as the principal staff arm of the Council and absorbed the assignments of existing ad hoc committees. The members of the Senior Staff were generally of Assistant Secretary level or above and met as a group approximately twice a week (sometimes more frequently) during the first year. Thus the Council was provided continuous staff support by a high-level interdepartmental staff group.

Meanwhile, the Staff Assistants, unlike the members of "The Staff", no longer spent almost full time in NSC offices, but instead maintained offices only in their respective agencies where they could play a more active role in the development of agency views on papers before the Senior Staff and the Council. The Staff Assistants as a group, however, continued to do much of the pick and shovel work of redrafting papers for the Senior Staff. Thus, while their semi-estrangement from their agencies was ended, they continued, as a group, to look at national security problems from more than an agency perspective and to take, as did the Senior Staff and the Council, a national point of view.

Another change of considerable significance was the arrangement with respect to the chairmanship of the two major interdepartmental staff groups. The April proposals of the Executive Secretary had made no recommendations on this point. The selection by the President of the Executive Secretary as the Chairman of the Senior Staff provided the principal staff body with a chairman who, as head of the permanent NSC

Staff in the Executive Office of the President, was an official without departmental ties. Although he maintained a neutral position as to policy recommendations, he participated actively in leading the discussion in an effort to bring out all relevant facts and viewpoints and to explore all feasible alternative policies. Of greatest significance was the fact that the Executive Secretary, because of his daily contact with the President, was in a position to know or to ascertain the President's desires and requirements with respect to problems before the Senior Staff and the Council. Selection of a member of the permanent Council staff as the chairman of the Staff Assistants was a change of parallel significance.

The 1950 changes also improved considerably the relationship between the Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the staff level by placing a JCS representative on both of the new interdepartmental staff groups. Finally, the changes provided the Secretary of the Treasury who, as previously noted, had been a regular Council participant since 1949, with representation at the staff level.

Subsequent Changes in the Council and Staff Organization

Two major changes in Council membership and staff participation occurred during the period following the 1950 reorganization. Immediately after the beginning of the Korean War, the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) was created to coordinate mobilization activities immediately connected with the war, as contrasted with general long-range mobilization planning, responsibility for which continued to reside in NSRB. In December 1950 the President requested that the Director of Defense Mobilization participate in all Council meetings and in March 1951 the Director nominated a Senior Staff Member. The Economic Cooperation Administration had participated on an ad hoc basis in Council activities at both the Council and staff levels since 1948. However, the foreign assistance organization began participating in all Council activities in October 1951 when the Mutual Security Act of 1951* amended the National Security Act to make the Director for Mutual Security (a newly created office) a statutory member of the Council. He, in turn, nominated a member for the Senior Staff.**

In August 1951 the Bureau of the Budget designated an individual to serve as its representative in a purely advisory role at meetings of the Senior Staff and as its channel of communication with the Senior Staff. This representative did not attend all Senior Staff meetings. The Director, Bureau of the Budget, did not normally attend Council meetings.

* Mutual Security Act of 1951, Public Law 165, 82nd Congress, Title V, Section 501-(e)-(1) (effective October 10, 1951).

** Since Mr. Harriman, who was designated Director for Mutual Security, had been attending Council meetings as a Presidential assistant and since he had a representative on the Senior Staff, the change in the statute did not affect attendance at Council and Senior Staff meetings though it did change the status of Mr. Harriman and his Senior Staff representative.

In August 1951 an additional function was assigned to the permanent career staff of the Council. The President at that time, in connection with his action on a report relating to the status of current national security programs, directed the Executive Secretary to create, as a part of the NSC Staff, a small reporting unit to work with the responsible departments and agencies to ensure that reports on the status of such programs were made available promptly to the Council or to the President. Initially two members of the NSC Staff were assigned to this function. They concentrated primarily upon the development and improvement, in cooperation with the agencies concerned, of regular semi-annual (later annual) status reports to the Council. These reports have regularly covered the military, mutual security, atomic energy, civil defense, mobilization, foreign information (now USIA), foreign intelligence, and U. S. internal security programs.* After the basic job of organizing this work had been done, the unit required only the part-time services of one individual. Apart from this addition and the designation of the Coordinator of Staff Assistants from the membership of the permanent career staff of the Council, the career staff was not basically changed as to function or organization during this period. However, members of the permanent career staff assisted the Executive Secretary in his roles as Chairman of the Senior Staff and as an assistant to the President for NSC matters by such means as suggesting questions with respect to papers before the Senior Staff, redrafting papers to reflect Senior Staff discussion, and suggesting deficiencies in existing policy coverage.

Senior Staff and Council Procedures

During the last half of 1950 and the first half of 1951 the Senior Staff and Council were very active, largely on policy matters relating to Korea and other problems arising out of the generally tense international situation. Questions relating to the strengthening of major national security programs occupied a significant proportion of the time of the Senior Staff and the Council during this period. As has been indicated, the Senior Staff met approximately twice a week and sometimes met more frequently during the first few months of its existence. The Council was meeting an average of three times a month.

The latter part of 1951 and all of 1952 were characterized by a resumption of a regular pattern of Council business. The Senior Staff reviewed existing policies and prepared policies on new subjects in response to changes in the situation or anticipated developments. It met on an average of about once a week.** Though a weekly NSC meeting continued to be scheduled, the scheduled meetings were sometimes cancelled and the Council met an average of somewhat less than twice a month during this period.

* Recently a report on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration programs has been added.

** In addition, as indicated below, Senior Staff steering committees were meeting during this period.

Also during the period 1950-51, as a result of Congressional passage of the "Cannon Amendment" on September 27, 1950, and the "Kem Amendment" which superseded it on June 2, 1951,* the Council was given new statutory responsibilities of a rather unprecedented character. In essence, the Cannon Amendment provided that, during any period in which the armed forces of the United States were engaged in active hostilities carrying out a decision of the Security Council of the United Nations, no financial or economic assistance (other than military assistance) could be provided to a foreign country whose trade with Sino-Soviet Bloc countries was found by the NSC to be contrary to U. S. security interests. This legislation did not require reports to Congress. The Kem Amendment spelled out in somewhat more detail what kinds of commodities fell under the trade proscription and required the Secretary of Defense to prepare a specific list of such commodities. It required certifications by the countries receiving U. S. assistance that they had not been engaging in such trade, but provided that exceptions could be made to these requirements upon official determination by the NSC that such an exception was in the security interests of the United States. The Council was required to report any such exception, with the reasons therefore, immediately to the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives, to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House. The Council was also required to make a quarterly review of such determinations and to report the results of its review to these committees. Finally, the Kem Amendment specified that each of these reports should contain an analysis of the trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc of the countries covered by the reports.

A Special Council Committee on East-West Trade undertook the required Staff work.** The Council made an initial over-all determination under the Cannon Amendment in December 1950 but directed its Special Committee to make a continuing review and recommendations as required. The Council approved its second (and last) determination under the Cannon amendment in February 1951 and directed the Special Committee to continue its review. Twenty determinations affecting thirty-six countries were prepared by the Special Committee under the Kem Amendment and submitted through the Senior Staff to the Council which approved them, transmitted them to the specified Congressional committees and released them publicly.*** The Committee also prepared, and the Council approved, a final report and review of its determinations. The legislative requirement for such Council determinations was eliminated when the Kem Amendment was superseded by the Mutual Defense Assistance

* Section 1304, Public Law 843, 81st Congress, September 27, 1950, and Section 1302, Public Law 45, 82nd Congress, June 2, 1951.

** Membership of this committee consisted of representatives of State, Treasury, Defense, Commerce, NSRB, ODM, ECA, JCS, CIA, Export-Import Bank, and Mr. Harriman's office.

*** A number of additional countries provided the required certifications thus obviating the need for Council determinations to cover them.

Control Act (the "Battle Act") on October 26, 1951.* Following the 1950 reorganization the State Department continued to be the source of first drafts of foreign country and regional policy papers which continued to constitute a major share of the Council's business. As in the past, other departments were the source of a first draft where the subject fell primarily within their area of responsibility and sometimes drafts were prepared in the Staff Assistants or in the Senior Staff on the basis of contributions from several agencies. After a preliminary discussion in the Senior Staff, a draft policy paper was ordinarily referred to the Staff Assistants for redrafting in the light of the discussion. The Staff Assistants' redraft was circulated to the Senior Staff for further consideration. This process was sometimes repeated one or more times before the paper was submitted to the Council. When the nature of a problem and the timing of action so dictated, the Senior Staff's work on a paper could, of course, be considerably speeded up. During the discussion of a draft policy paper in the Senior Staff, any Senior Staff member could suggest new ideas or alternative policies. The many ideas and policy alternatives generated by this process of interchange in the Senior Staff frequently provided the basis either for agreed or for "split" policy recommendations to the Council.

Toward the end of this period an increasing amount of the preliminary preparation of papers was done in steering committees of restricted membership from the Senior Staff and Board Assistants prior to consideration by the full membership of these groups. A principal objective of this arrangement was to permit greater frankness of interchange on sensitive subjects among the representatives of those agencies which had the most direct concern with the particular subject matter.

In September 1950, shortly after the Council reorganization, the Senior Staff agreed to a new format for Council policy papers. What had formerly appeared at the end of the paper as "Conclusions" was now placed at the front of the paper as a draft "Statement of Policy". This Statement of Policy contained the Council's policy advice to the President and was the only part of the paper that the Council adopted and the President subsequently approved. The Statement of Policy was followed by an "NSC Staff Study" which normally included four major sections: (a) a statement of the problem; (b) an analysis, which usually included such elements as a statement of approved policies and other relevant facts bearing on the problem, an assessment and appraisal of U. S. objectives, commitments and risks in relation to actual and potential U. S. military power, an estimate of the situation and probable future developments, and other more particular factors bearing on the problem; (c) an enumeration and analysis of alternative courses of action; and (d) conclusions. During this period the format of the Statement of Policy went through a further evolution. By the end of the period it typically included three elements: (a) general considerations which consisted essentially of a summary statement of the elements contained in the analysis section

* Public Law 213, 82nd Congress.

of the staff study; (b) a statement of U. S. objectives; and (c) courses of action.

With staff work completed, the paper was circulated to the Council in advance of the Council meeting. The Joint Chiefs of Staff ordinarily submitted their views on the paper in advance of the meeting and these too were usually circulated. Each Senior Staff member was responsible for briefing his principal in advance of the meeting on the subjects before the Council; the Executive Secretary similarly briefed the President. The Council's agenda, which was determined by the President in consultation with the Executive Secretary, continued to include a variety of different kinds of reports and presentations. In the Council meeting the Executive Secretary, as Chairman of the Senior Staff, presented the Senior Staff's papers. Other procedures remained basically unchanged. Though the President now presided at Council meetings, he continued to reserve his own decision on Council policy recommendations until after the Council meeting when those recommendations were presented to him by the Executive Secretary for approval together with the record of the Council's actions.

When the President approved a policy recommended to him by the Council, he continued to designate the department or agency which had primary responsibility for action to coordinate its implementation. During this period he sometimes designated two agencies, (e.g., State and Defense) as joint coordinators. The coordinating agency continued to submit progress reports; in the case of policies under joint coordination these were joint reports. Toward the end of the 1950-52 period, progress reports were often submitted less frequently than every six months.

The format for progress reports, as it had developed by this time in the Council's history, contained two basic elements: (a) a summary of important U. S. actions to implement the policy, and important developments which had favorably or unfavorably affected the policy or its implementation; and (b) a brief assessment of the effectiveness, adequacy and timeliness of the policy and its implementation. Progress reports did not propose specific changes in policy, but indicated the respects, if any, in which the policy was inadequate and needed review. If the Council recommended, on the basis of the information in a progress report, that a policy be reviewed and if the President approved that recommendation, the review itself was undertaken by the Senior Staff.

The Psychological Strategy Board

The Council had, virtually since its inception, regularly considered problems relating to the organization of psychological (including foreign information) activities. As a result of one such discussion in January 1951 the President requested Mr. Souers, his Special Consultant, and the Bureau of the Budget to make a further study and recommendations. Based upon this study the President in the Spring of 1951 issued a directive

establishing the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB).* With a basic membership of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence and with a fulltime Director and staff, the PSB was responsible for the "formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort". Although the PSB was established outside the NSC structure, the Board was directed to report to the Council "on its activities and on its evaluation of the national psychological operations including implementation of approved objectives, policies, and programs by the departments and agencies concerned". The Director of the PSB was invited to attend Council meetings as an Observer and was represented by an Adviser on the Senior Staff.**

* White House Press Release, June 20, 1951.

** Mr. Gordon Gray was one of the Directors of PSB who attended Council meetings as an Observer and Mr. Robert Cutler was one of those who served as PSB Adviser to the Senior Staff. Both of these individuals were later to serve as Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs.

IV. THE THIRD PHASE (JANUARY 1953 TO THE PRESENT)

Introduction

The third phase of the Council's existence began with a thorough reappraisal of the Council's organization, as it had developed to 1953, and of the then current national security policies. By direction of President Truman, current national security policies were made available shortly after the 1952 election to President-elect Eisenhower, together with brief progress reports on each and related intelligence material. In late December 1952 the President-elect advised the Executive Secretary that Mr. Robert Cutler would be his Administrative Assistant with special responsibilities for the NSC. Mr. Cutler visited Washington soon after, and, on January 21, 1953, was sworn in as Administrative Assistant to the President. Mr. Cutler immediately embarked upon a thorough, wide-ranging study of the Council organization. At the same time he began to attend and to take an active part in Senior Staff meetings.

The President on January 21 asked each statutory Council member (excepting the President and Vice President), the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence to designate, on a temporary basis pending permanent arrangements, an acting member of the Senior Staff. This temporary Senior Staff continued in existence until the President approved Mr. Cutler's proposals for Council reorganization in March. Attendance at the first Council meeting of the new Administration on January 29, 1953, was restricted to the statutory members and advisers. However, the Secretary of the Treasury was invited by the President on February 2 to attend all Council meetings and to designate an acting member of the Senior Staff.*

The reappraisal of the Council by the new Administration was designed to strengthen and improve it and to adapt it to the needs and desires of President Eisenhower. This reappraisal was based upon certain fundamental concepts with respect to the nature of the Council and how it should operate. These concepts contained a number of important elements of innovation; other elements were derived from the National Security Act itself or were built upon prior experience in the development and operation of the Council. Together these concepts form a coherent body of thinking on the subject, the understanding of which is important to an appreciation of the changes subsequently made in the Council organization. They are stated here as eight key considerations:**

- * The activities of the Senior Staff and Council during these first two months are discussed below.
- ** Most of these considerations can be readily derived from an article by Mr. Cutler in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 34, pp. 441-458. (April 1956) or from his March 1953 report to the President.

1. The importance of the Presidential advisory character of the Council, and, deriving therefrom, the importance of adjusting the Council's operation to the needs of the new President.
2. The importance of achieving a proper balance in Council attendance between the consideration on the one hand of obtaining the advice of all who have some responsibility for the subject matter under consideration, and, on the other, of restricting attendance to that level which would permit intimate, frank and fruitful discussion.
3. The importance of a highly active, vigorous organization; an organization characterized by regular and frequent meetings, full agenda, vigorous discussion and strong leadership at all levels.
4. The importance of the most thorough sort of discussion in inter-departmental staff groups below the Council as a means of ensuring preparation of "precisely worded, carefully studied, and well presented"** papers which avoided ex parte presentation on the one hand, and the suppression of real differences of view on the other.
5. The importance of viewing the Council and its subordinate groups as bodies made up of individuals advising the President in their own right and not simply as the representatives of their agencies.
6. The importance of relying fundamentally upon the responsible officials represented on the Council and upon their staffs for ideas, for analysis and for the preparation of policy advice, thus avoiding an "ivory tower" approach or the inter-position of individuals without departmental responsibilities between the President and his responsible Cabinet officials. At the same time, the importance of (a) bringing fresh points of view to bear upon the Council's work through increased use of outside consultants; and (b) strengthening the capabilities of the permanent Council staff for independent analysis and review of national security problems and policy papers.
7. The importance of taking into account the financial implications of proposed policies; their effect upon the fiscal and budgetary situation and upon the domestic economy.
8. The importance of ensuring that approved national security policies are implemented in an integrated, coordinated fashion and in such a way as to make a full contribution to the particular climate of opinion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world.

* Ibid, p. 447

Reorganization of the Council and the Staff

In the course of Mr. Cutler's study of the Council organization he consulted regularly with the President and solicited views from a number of people both inside and outside the government who had knowledge of and, in many cases, direct experience with the Council mechanism. Included in these consultations were former Council and Senior Staff Members and the former and present Executive Secretary. In addition to obtaining the individual views of such knowledgeable persons orally or in writing (or both), Mr. Cutler met with small groups of them in all-day sessions. Mr. Cutler also consulted with and obtained the assistance of the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and his staff and the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization.

On March 16, 1953, he submitted his report to the President who approved it the following day. The report recommended many changes, but because it also incorporated all of the basic instructions governing the organization and operation of the Council and its subordinate bodies, it confirmed a number of already existing arrangements as well.

After reaffirming the Presidential-advisory character of the Council, the report found that no changes were required in the existing statutory statement of the functions of the Council.

On the subject of attendance at Council meetings the report stated that, as a general rule no more than eight persons should have the right to participate as Council members. The report distinguished the several types of attendance at Council meetings, establishing five different categories of attendance: (a) statutory members, (b) participant members, (c) advisors (statutory and other), (d) observers, and (e) staff. Within the category of "participant members" a further distinction was made between those individuals who were invited on a "standing-request" basis to attend all Council meetings until the President otherwise decided and those who were invited to attend a meeting or a part of a meeting on an "ad hoc" basis. The categories generally formalized prior practice and were of value in providing a framework within which individual decisions on attendance could be made on a flexible basis in the light of the requirements of a particular Council agenda.

The report confirmed existing arrangements as to actual Council attendance with two exceptions: (a) it provided that the statutory membership of the Chairman, NSRB, should be transferred to the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization,* and (b) the Special Assistant to the President

* Reorganization Plan 3 of 1953 (effective June 12, 1953) abolished NSRB and transferred all of the functions of the Chairman, NSRB. (except those that it abolished altogether) to the Director, ODM.

for Cold War Planning became an Adviser to the Council while the Director, Psychological Strategy Board, was eliminated as an Observer. Thus, the Council membership was limited to a regular group of seven participants (the statutory members* and the Secretary of the Treasury). The two statutory advisers plus the Special Assistant for Cold War Planning also attended regularly. The absorption of NSRB by ODM had reduced the number of Council participants by one.

An important innovation was the provision that, if the President was unable to attend a Council meeting, the Vice President would preside in his stead.** Only in the absence of both the President and the Vice President would the Secretary of State preside. The report specified that a regular weekly meeting time should be established and ordinarily maintained.

The report explicitly rejected participation in the Council by individuals who had no departmental responsibilities. However, it provided for the appointment on an ad hoc basis of Consultants from outside the government who would, either individually or in groups, serve as informal advisers to the Council. Two examples were cited of the potential use of such consultants: (a) to consider some specific new proposals or long-range project and report to the Council (in such a case its report would be reviewed by the agencies concerned); and (b) to review for the Council a proposal developed by the Planning Board.

The Senior Staff was renamed the "Planning Board", but retained the same functions. With the exception of the elimination of NSRB, the agency representation on the Planning Board remained unchanged though the representatives of the JCS and CIA were re-designated "Advisers" rather than "Members".*** However, as Advisers they retained their right

* The President and Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director for Mutual Security and the Director, ODM.

** President Eisenhower has presided at 306 (or 90%) of the 338 Council meetings held from January 29, 1953, through June 30, 1960.

*** Members of the Planning Board at this time were, in addition to the Special Assistant, representatives of State, Treasury, Defense, Mutual Security and ODM. JCS, CIA and PSB were represented by Advisers. When PSB was later abolished and the Operations Coordinating Board established, a member of the OCB Staff (usually the Executive Officer or his Deputy) was a Planning Board Adviser. As noted below, this arrangement was further amended in 1957.

to have their dissents, if any, included in Planning Board reports to the Council. As in the past, other agencies might be invited by the Chairman to attend Planning Board meetings for items of interest to them. The chairmanship of the Planning Board was assigned to the newly established Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs* instead of the Executive Secretary. This assignment was consistent with the important principle, mentioned earlier, that the Chairman of the Council's principal policy-formulating staff body should be a person without departmental ties who through a direct and close staff relationship with the President was fully cognizant of the desires and the requirements of the President.

Mr. Cutler's report renamed the "Staff Assistants" the "Board Assistants". They continued, however, to have the same functions and to be chaired by a Coordinator from the NSC Staff.**

Though, apart from the change in chairmanship, the membership and functions of the Planning Board were not essentially changed by the report, the report did contain some important specifications with respect to appointment of individual Planning Board Members and Advisers. It continued the provision for nomination by the agency head and appointment by the President (after approval by the Special Assistant).*** It stated that each Member or Adviser should have direct access to and the personal confidence of his agency head. (Generally speaking, Planning Board members are Assistant Secretaries, or equivalent, within their departments or agencies.) Most importantly, the report specified that each Member or Adviser should:

"...have as his principal responsibility, which over-rides all other duties and with which no other duty can interfere, his work with the Board, including preparation for and attendance at meetings; yet at the same time continue to be sufficiently in the stream of activity of his department or agency so as to be capable of representing its views."

This requirement was addressed to a problem that had appeared toward the end of the 1950-53 period. Senior Staff Members, though of high caliber and adequate rank, frequently became so absorbed in departmental responsibilities that they found it difficult to devote sufficient time and attention to NSC work. They tended to delegate real responsibility for Senior Staff work to alternates or to the head of the office within their

* The functions of the Special Assistant are described in greater detail just below.

** The Advisers from the three military services ceased attending Board Assistants meetings after April 1953. They continue, however, to provide support to Defense and JCS Planning Board representatives by assisting in the development of service views on the papers before the Planning Board and the Council.

*** Each Planning Board Member and Adviser receives a personal letter of appointment from the President.

agencies who was responsible for the particular subject matter being considered.

The report emphasized the importance of ensuring that the Board was constantly aware of the matters in which the Council was interested, though ideas for projects might germinate at any level in the organization. Finally, it stated that if conflicts of view could not be fairly resolved, they should never be suppressed or compromised, but should be reported to the Council.

The report simply listed the other existing standing committees of the Council and proposed no changes in them at that time.

One of the most important changes introduced by the report was the creation of the position of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Special Assistant was named the principal executive officer of the Council and Chairman of the NSC Planning Board. This change represented the designation by the President of a member of the White House Staff as his principal staff officer for national security affairs. The Executive Secretary, who had previously performed this general role, was reappointed head of the career staff of the Council and was designated to act for the Special Assistant in his absence and to advise and aid him in the performance of his duties.

The Special Assistant was made responsible for determination, subject to the President's desires, of the Council agenda, for briefing the President in advance of Council meetings,* and for presenting matters for discussion at the Council meetings. As Chairman of the Planning Board he was responsible for scheduling Planning Board work and for the manner of presentation and quality of such work. He was to appoint (subject where necessary to the President's approval) such ad hoc committees, such consultants from outside the Government and such mixed governmental-non-governmental committees as might be required. He supervised the work of the NSC Staff through the Executive Secretary.

Finally, the Special Assistant was charged with bringing to the attention of the President, with recommendations for appropriate action,

* It might be noted here that, with the beginning of the new Administration in 1953, responsibility for daily briefing of the President on current foreign politico-military developments was transferred from the Executive Secretary to the White House Staff Secretary. The Executive Secretary did continue to participate in the Special Assistant's briefing of the President before Council meetings.

lack of progress by an agency in carrying out any policy assigned to it; provided it was not possible to expedite performance at the Planning Board level. The report emphasized, however, that responsibility for implementation rested with the agency head concerned and that the role of the Special Assistant was, on behalf of the President, to inspect, not to evaluate or to direct. Mr. Cutler was named the President's first Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.*

The NSC Staff, headed by the Executive Secretary, was to continue to provide the secretariat for the Council and the Planning Board, to act as the official channel of communications for the Council and to provide, with CIA support, administrative services for the Council. The report confirmed the new arrangement under which the NSC Staff was responsible for briefing the Vice President on the matters before the Council.

In addition, as a final important change, the report provided for the strengthening of the NSC Staff by the establishment within it of a small "Special Staff" under the supervision of the Deputy Executive Secretary with, among others, the following duties: (a) independent analysis and review of each Planning Board report before its submission to the Council; (b) continuous examination of the totality of national security policies with a view to determining if gaps existed which should be filled and if important issues or anticipated developments were sufficiently explored; (c) continuing integrated evaluation of the capabilities of the free world versus the capabilities of the Soviet and Satellites, and estimates of the situation, in order to bring such evaluations and estimates before the Council; (d) providing a chairman or member of, or observer with, ad hoc non-governmental or mixed governmental-non-governmental committees, and assistance, in recruiting such committees; and (e) keeping currently informed on the status of all national security programs and seeing that reports and pertinent information thereon were currently available (thus incorporating the functions of the Reporting Unit). The Special Staff, when it was established, was made up of two members of the existing professional staff of the Council (plus the Deputy Executive Secretary) and three additional staff officers. It continues to have, in addition to the Deputy Executive Secretary, five professional members today.

The report re-affirmed and emphasized the distinction between the Council, the Planning Board and the Special Assistant on the one hand and the NSC Staff on the other. The former group, it was recognized, was a part of and would change with changes in the Administration; the latter group, the report stated, should not be subject to change with political change.

* Mr. Cutler served from March 1953 to March 1955 and again from January 1957 to July 1958. Others who have held this position have been Mr. Dillon Anderson (April 1955-August 1956); Mr. William H. Jackson (Acting) (September 1956-December 1956); and Mr. Gordon Gray (July 1958 to the present).

Subsequent Changes in the Organization of the Council and the Planning Board

The basic organization of the Council established by the March 17, 1953, report has been altered in only one fundamental respect since that time. That alteration occurred late in the same year when, on September 3, the President issued an Executive Order creating the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). Because the development of the OCB is itself a large subject, it has been treated separately below, along with changes in the NSC Staff that relate to the integration of the OCB within the NSC structure in 1957.

Several changes in Council participation, and related changes in Planning Board participation, occurred during the period. Attention will be concentrated here upon the changes that have occurred in the group of officials who have been entitled to participate fully in the work of the Council either as statutory members or as "participant members".

Beginning in early February 1953 the Director, Bureau of the Budget, began to attend Council meetings. Although he attended almost all meetings, he was, until July 1953, invited on an ad hoc basis for particular agenda items. During this period a representative of Budget also participated in the work of the Planning Board on an ad hoc basis.* In early July 1953 the Director became a standing-request participant member of the Council and was represented thereafter on the Planning Board by a full member.

As already noted, the Council membership of the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) was transferred in 1953 to the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). On July 1, 1958, the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization was established, absorbing the functions of ODM and the Federal Civil Defense Administration and assuming ODM's Council and Planning Board memberships.** When the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) succeeded the Mutual Security Agency on August 6, 1953, the membership on the NSC of the Director for Mutual Security was transferred to the new Director of FOA.*** When FOA was subsequently abolished on June 30, 1955, and its functions were transferred to the new International Cooperation Administration (ICA) within the State Department,

* The Director designated an individual who was available for such case-by-case participation as was determined necessary. This Budget representative was assisted by an individual who served as the normal point of contact and liaison with the NSC Staff. Budget during this period received the agenda and reports of the NSC and the Planning Board.

** Reorganization Plan 1 of 1958

*** Reorganization Plan 7 of 1953

the membership of the Director, FOA, on the Council was abolished.* However, the Director of ICA was authorized by the President to attend Council meetings as an adviser to the Secretary of State. Subsequently, when responsibility for over-all coordination of the Mutual Security Program was assigned to the Under Secretary of State, he was invited to attend Council meetings as an observer, in lieu of the Director, ICA.** The Mutual Security program function was represented on the Planning Board by a member until FOA was abolished. At that time an ICA Observer was designated to provide staff support for the State Member of the Board, attending Board meetings when items of interest to ICA were under consideration. These arrangements continue to the present.

A further sub-category was added to the list of categories of Council participation during this period in order to provide a further degree of flexibility. A distinction was made between "Regular Participant" members who attended all Council meetings until the President otherwise determined (*i. e.*, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget) and "Special-Request Members" who had a standing Presidential invitation to attend Council meetings, but only for meetings or parts of meetings which were concerned with matters relating to their official responsibilities. The practice of making such a distinction developed gradually in the period 1955-57. This practice was formalized by Mr. Cutler when he returned as Special Assistant in early 1957 and issued, on July 1, 1957, a Presidentially-approved revision of his statement of March 17, 1953, on the structure and functions of the Council. These Special-Request members are represented by observers on the Planning Board who have a similar standing invitation to attend Planning Board meetings for items of interest to their agencies. They receive Council and Planning Board agendas and other necessary Council and Planning Board documents. Currently Special-Request members of the Council are the Attorney General, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).*** In the past the officials in this

* His membership on the NSC was abolished by Executive Order 10610, Section 303 (a) and (b). FOA itself was abolished by the Mutual Security Act of 1954. (Public Law 665. 83rd Congress)

** The Director, ICA, does, however, attend Council meetings from time to time on an ad hoc basis.

*** The Attorney General began attending Council meetings regularly during the President's first illness in the fall of 1955. Following the President's recovery he was given the status described above. The Chairman, AEC, began attending meetings on the above basis in January 1956. Earlier he had attended as an observer in his capacity as Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy Matters and continued to do so from time to time after January 1956 when he was not participating as the Chairman, AEC. The Administrator of NASA was given this status on August 19, 1958, just after approval of the National Aeronautics and Space Act which established NASA.

category have included the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament,* and, before FCDA and ODM were combined, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.

Various officials have, from time to time, been invited to attend Council meetings for items of interest to them as "Observers". Though no attempt will be made to recount all of the changes in this group, its composition may be illustrated by the following list of officials who are presently in this category: The Assistant to the President and The Deputy Assistant, the Director, U.S. Information Agency (USIA),** the Special Assistants to the President for Foreign Economic Policy and for Science and Technology, and the White House Staff Secretary and his assistant. The Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and Security Operations Coordination, together with the Executive Secretary and his Deputy, regularly attend Council meetings as the Council staff. Ordinarily the Council participants, apart from the Secretaries of State and Defense, do not bring supporting staff personnel to the meeting except as may be necessary when they make special presentations to the Council. USIA and the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, as well as Justice, AEC and NASA, are represented at the Planning Board level by Observers.

It should be noted that actual attendance at Council meetings varies according to the type of report being considered and the character of the meeting. Thus, when the Council hears a presentation of some special study or report, a number of additional officials may be invited to attend and the purpose of the meeting may be largely expository. At the other end of the spectrum is an occasional Council meeting on a sensitive subject to which only the statutory members of the Council, the statutory advisers and essential Council and White House staff are invited. Attendance at the usual Council meetings, when the agenda is a normal one of Planning Board and other reports, falls somewhere between these two unusual cases. The regular Council attendants who sit at the Council table are the five statutory members (the President, Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director, OCDM), the two statutory advisers (the Chairman, JCS, and the Director of Central Intelligence), the Director, USIA, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Executive Secretary and the Deputy Executive Secretary.

In February 1953 the Council had agreed that the existing internal security organization of the Council should be continued. However, in

* The Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament was represented on the Planning Board by a Member.

** The Director, USIA is the only Observer who sits at the Council table.

April 1954, the President requested the Attorney General, in cooperation with the interested departments and agencies, to make a study of the internal security organization of the government and to make recommendations to the Council on the subject. On September 10, 1954, the President approved recommendations by the Attorney General, as amended and adopted by the Council. In general these recommendations continued the existing internal security organization of the Council, including its two internal security committees (the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS)) and its Representative on Internal Security. The major new provisions were as follows: (a) the Chairmen of the two committees were hereafter to be designated by the President from the membership of the committees after consultation with the Attorney General; (b) the Attorney General was to continue to take a leading role in NSC consideration of internal security matters and the Justice Observer was to take a similar role in the Planning Board (receiving all necessary Planning Board papers); (c) representatives of the IIC and ICIS were to attend meetings of the Planning Board or other committees of the NSC to participate in matters relating to the responsibilities of the two committees; and (d) the joint report on the internal security program, which IIC and ICIS were already submitting as a part of the semi-annual (later annual) status reports on national security programs, was to be considered a substitute for separate reports to the Council by the NSC Representative on Internal Security; subject, however, to the understanding that the latter might submit comments on the joint IIC-ICIS report.*

* The NSC Representative on Internal Security has since 1949 attended meetings of the Council whenever matters relating to internal security are scheduled for consideration.

Planning Board and Council Procedures

On October 13, 1953 the Council noted a statement by the President that his conception of the NSC was that of:

"a corporate body composed of individuals advising the President in their own right, rather than as representatives of their respective departments and agencies. Their function should be to seek, with their background of experience, the most statesmanlike solution to the problems of national security, rather than to reach solutions which represent merely a compromise of departmental positions. The same concept is equally applicable to advisory and subordinate groups, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NSC Planning Board."*

This concept continues to govern the work of the Council and its subordinate bodies.

On January 21, 1953, at the time that Council members were asked to designate acting members for a Senior Staff, they were also informed that the initial assignment of the new Senior Staff members would be to develop, after consultation with their respective principals, an agenda of policy questions listed in approximate order of priority, based upon: (a) a preliminary review of current policies; (b) examination of currently active Council projects; and (c) initiation of new policies or projects.

The period 1953-54 was marked by very great activity. The Planning Board (before March 17, 1953, the Senior Staff) met regularly three times a week. During particularly busy periods it met even more frequently. Meetings were from three to five hours long and the agenda regularly included from three to five items. The Council met an average of once a week and its agendas, too, were very full.

During 1953 much of the Council and Planning Board's time was devoted to: (a) certain urgent and critical international problems; (b) certain problems relating to the scope and character of major national security programs; and (c) a thorough examination of alternative over-all strategies and policies. At the same time a general review of existing national security policies was undertaken. In 1954 an increasing amount of the Council and Planning Board's time was devoted to this review and by the end of that year it had been largely completed. Interspersed with these activities was the development of policies on a number of new subjects.

With the end of hostilities in Korea and Indochina in 1953 and 1954 and with the completion of the initial review of national security policies in

* When the President approved a revised statement of the structure and functions of the NSC on July 1, 1957, the OCB was added to the list of advisory and subordinate groups, and the statement was clarified by addition at the end of the phrase "although the members of the latter two boards [i. e., the Planning Board and the OCB] are responsible also for stating the views of their respective departments and agencies."

early 1955, the Council and Planning Board entered a period characterized by a somewhat reduced pace of activity and by reversion to a regular pattern of business. Beginning in mid-1955 and continuing to the present time, two Planning Board meetings per week became the rule, though additional meetings were sometimes scheduled. The Council has also met somewhat less frequently than in the first two years, the number of meetings ranging from 36 to 43 per year. Much of the Council's and Planning Board's time in the years 1955-56 was devoted to regular activities involved in developing new policies or reviewing existing policies in the light of current and anticipated developments. Perhaps the most significant individual projects during these two years were comprehensive studies which were done for the Council by outside groups or government committees of certain important national security programs. Thus certain military programs were studied in the light of technological developments. Similarly, a study was made of certain aspects of the foreign assistance programs. Both of these studies initiated long cycles of Planning Board and Council activity during which new policy guidance affecting important programs was developed.

A new aspect of the value of the National Security Council was demonstrated in the fall of 1955 at the time of the President's first major illness. By that time, as noted, the Council had built up a reservoir of Presidential- approved national security policies. These permitted the heads of the various government departments to carry on "with full knowledge of the continued validity of the broad concepts established by the President in the cumulative experience of the NSC."* The Vice President presided over the Council during this period and the Council provided a useful forum for discussion of national security problems. Shortly after the middle of October 1955 the President began to be kept informed of the Council's actions and began acting upon them. The Council performed in a similar fashion, though for a shorter period, following the President's second illness in June 1956.

The second Administration of President Eisenhower began in the Council with a reevaluation of various major elements of basic security policy on the basis of a series of discussion papers, each of which examined one of the major aspects of the over-all U. S. security policy. On the basis of the new basic policy, certain other security policies were also re-examined. Further studies were also made of certain national security programs. New policies were prepared against the background of a world situation characterized by such outstanding features as the developing capabilities of the United States and the USSR in the field of intercontinental ballistic missiles; the actual or anticipated emergence of a large number of newly independent countries; and the beginning of the exploration of outer space. The Council also reviewed its general directives relating to the organization and coordination of the foreign intelligence activities of the several departments and agencies.

In the latter part of the period there has been a resumption once more of the regular process of policy re-examination and revision, but there has also been an increased effort to use the Council for discussion of major policy issues facing the United States now and in the future, without necessarily

* Dillon Anderson, "The President and National Security", The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 197, p. 442, (January 1956).

seeking immediate policy decisions on those issues. To this end increased use has been made of consultants and of discussion papers which consider the pros and cons of policy alternatives without themselves recommending a policy. There has also been an emphasis upon the preparation of long-range studies of major problems the United States is likely to face over the next five to ten years as background which will be of assistance in the development of future policies.

The procedures of the Planning Board during the entire period from 1953 to the present date have not varied significantly in basic outline although, of course, they have been adjusted when necessary to meet the requirements of a particular policy problem or the character of a particular type of report. The procedures are also in many fundamental respects comparable to those which earlier characterized the activities of the Senior Staff. Before the first draft of a new policy paper is prepared, the subject is sometimes discussed on the basis of the existing policy, an intelligence estimate, a military appreciation or similar material. An intelligence estimate may be requested if a current one is not available. The CIA representatives maintain close contact with the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and with the NSC Staff in order to ensure, so far as possible, that intelligence estimates are available at the time required.

First drafts of foreign country and regional papers continue to be prepared in the State Department, just as first drafts of other types of papers are ordinarily prepared by the agency of primary interest, or, in some instances, by a Planning Board Committee. As in the past, papers are upon occasion prepared directly by the Planning Board or the Board Assistants, sometimes on the basis of a first draft prepared by the NSC Staff to reflect a Planning Board discussion.

The format of Council papers went through a further evolution during this period. Initially the statement of policy of a typical country or regional policy paper continued to consist of three basic elements: general considerations, objectives, and courses of action. In 1955 and 1956 there was some experimentation with the addition of a new section of "policy conclusions" which, in general character, fell somewhere between general considerations and courses of action. Essentially the "policy conclusions" constituted a statement of the main policy guidelines. Beginning in 1957 such policy conclusions began to be eliminated; the courses of action were renamed "major policy guidance" and were changed somewhat by the inclusion in them of material that had previously been contained in the "policy conclusions" section. This change was in line with the affirmation by the President at about this time of the principle that, except as directed by him, matters to be considered by the Council should insofar as possible deal with the making or alteration of broad policies - either policies for the future or policies required by currently developing events.

Initially almost all policy papers were accompanied by a staff study. In fact, the preparation of such a staff study and its discussion in the Planning Board was sometimes the first step in the preparation of a new or revised policy paper. More recently staff studies have not usually been prepared, except in the case of a wholly new policy subject or in a case where

developments since the approval of the last policy paper are such as to seem to require preparation of such a staff study. The general considerations, of course, cover the same ground, though in somewhat less detail, and they are regularly supported by the more detailed treatment of a current intelligence estimate.

The above-described format applies particularly to country and regional policy papers. As an outline it also covers the principal elements of almost all other policy papers considered by the Council though the material in some of these may be somewhat differently organized.

The most important innovation in the format of Council papers during the period was the addition, in July 1953, of a "Financial Appendix" to policy papers having financial implications. Such appendices are included in "functional" as well as country and regional policy papers. Though the form of Financial Appendices has evolved since 1953, its purpose and its general content have remained essentially unchanged.* The primary purpose of the Financial Appendix is to indicate, for the information of the Planning Board and the Council, the cost implications of the proposed policy. It normally contains information on past expenditures and order of magnitude estimates of future programs. It includes statements of assumptions and other information essential to an understanding of the cost data. The Financial Appendix does not presume to dispose of policy issues. It is submitted purely for the information of the Council and the Planning Board. Approval of a policy statement does not indicate approval of the cost estimates in the Financial Appendix.

A first draft of a policy paper is ordinarily discussed first in the Planning Board and then referred to the Board Assistants for revision in the light of the discussion. This process may, if necessary, be repeated several times. When a problem is particularly urgent the Planning Board has on occasion met in almost continuous session and has itself done the essential redrafting.

In the process of Planning Board and Board Assistants discussion the Planning Board members and their Board Assistants obtain their agencies' views on each successive draft. The NSC Staff, and more particularly, the Executive Secretary, his Deputy and members of the Special Staff, support the Special Assistant in his role as Chairman of the Planning Board. Members of the Special Staff make an independent analysis and review of each Planning Board paper at each stage in its development for the benefit of the Special Assistant and the Executive Secretary. They also participate in the meetings of the Board Assistants.

* Financial Appendices are prepared by the NSC Staff on the basis of contributions from the agencies responsible for the programs involved and are reviewed by the Planning Board. For the current directive on the use of Financial Appendices see "Organizing for National Security", Selected Materials prepared for the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, and its Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 26-28.

The Special Assistant plays a leading role in the Planning Board meetings as presiding officer and as a non-voting participant. He expresses his personal views in the course of the Planning Board discussion of a subject, but as the principal staff officer of the President for national security affairs, he is concerned primarily to ensure that the paper is adequate and that it satisfactorily reflects the views of the members of the Planning Board representing the various agencies. In particular, he is concerned with ensuring that, if there are significant differences of view as to policy recommendations within the Board, they are fully discussed and presented to the Council as clearly and accurately as possible. In recent experience about two-thirds of the papers sent to the Council by the Planning Board have contained such "splits". The Special Assistant's own views are not recorded in the paper when it goes forward to the Council. In the Council meeting, he makes an impartial presentation of the views of the Planning Board members, but also, if he wishes, expresses his own personal views to the Council following such presentation.

When a paper has been submitted by the head of an agency for direct circulation to the Council, the Planning Board almost always discusses it in advance of its consideration in the Council and sometimes prepares written comments upon it for consideration by the Council. Similarly, oral presentations for the Council are often made first to the Planning Board. Reports by outside study groups, by consultants or by special Council committees are also regularly discussed in the Planning Board prior to their consideration by the Council and may be referred back to the Planning Board for the preparation of recommendations following preliminary Council consideration. These procedures help ensure that Council members will be well briefed on Council agenda subjects prior to Council meetings. Nonetheless the Council does, when the occasion warrants it, consider reports, either oral or written, which have not been discussed first in the Planning Board and which are not the basis of subsequent Planning Board work.

In the usual case a Planning Board paper is circulated to the Council ten days in advance of the Council meeting at which it is considered in order to give the agencies sufficient opportunity to prepare for Council consideration and to give the Joint Chiefs of Staff time for preparation of their comments. Written JCS comments are submitted on most policy papers and are normally circulated to the Council in advance of the meeting. Each Planning Board member is responsible for briefing his Council principal on the matters before the Council in advance of the Council meetings.

As has been indicated, the character of the reports that the Council considers may be of various kinds. Such reports may include, for example, proposed policies prepared by the Planning Board, policy proposals submitted directly by Council members or other agency heads, oral presentations of special studies, OCB Reports and regular briefings.

In accordance with a directive of the President in January 1953, one feature of every Council meeting is an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence summarizing important developments that are occurring throughout the world. He gives particular attention to those areas which are on the

Council agenda that day.* "The President looks to the Special Assistant at Council meetings to present the items upon the agenda, to brief the Council on their background, to explain any 'splits' and to initiate discussion. Views are sought around the table so as to bring out relevant facts and opinions and so as to give those present an opportunity to participate in making policy which they must later carry out."** In the course of the Council discussion, the Council members may agree upon a resolution of the policy questions at issue or the President may indicate his own decision. The discussion sometimes stimulates a request by the Council or the President for an additional report on a related subject.

Following the Council meeting a record of the Council's actions is drafted by the Executive Secretary and his Deputy, reviewed by the Special Assistant and then circulated for comment by the Council members and advisers. This latter procedure, introduced at the beginning of the Eisenhower Administration in 1953, gives the Council participants an opportunity to see and comment upon the record of actions before it is submitted to the President. The President's action on this record, including his resolution of any remaining differences of view, constitutes his authoritative decision on the matters considered by the Council. The Presidnetially-approved actions and policy papers continue to be communicated to the Council participants by the means described above.***

Much use has been made of outside consultants and consultant groups during this entire phase of the Council's existence. Such consultants have been utilized upon approximately twenty occasions.**** The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs may himself arrange to call in such consultants, or one of the Council members may be asked to contract with some existing institution or to form a special consultants group to make a particular study. Essentially, use of such consultants has served one of three purposes: (a) to make an independent study of some proposal or of some problem; (b) to review existing policy on a subject and to make comments with

* The report on the status of NSC projects has been dropped as a regular agenda item. Instead a forward agenda and a summary of Council and Planning Board projects are issued regularly and are periodically reviewed by the Planning Board.

** Gordon Gray, "Role of the National Security Council in the Formulation of National Policy," paper prepared for delivery at the 1959 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., September 10-12, 1959, (reproduced in "Organizing for National Security": Selected Materials prepared for the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, and its Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, p. 66).

*** Supra, p. 16

**** In a recent review of a fundamental policy paper 23 consultants met with the Planning Board in groups of four or five and gave their views on the policy under review; later a large group of them met in a body with the Planning Board and commented upon the revised draft of the policy paper prepared by the Board. (Gray, op. cit., p. 65)

respect thereto; or (c) to comment on tentative recommendations being considered by the Planning Board prior to their submission to the Council. As a general rule such consultants discuss their recommendations with the Planning Board prior to Council consideration of them. In cases where the consultants have made a study and specific recommendations, those recommendations have regularly been referred to the responsible agencies for comment prior to final Council action. The Council's and Planning Board's work on such consultants' recommendations has often involved thorough study over a period of several months, followed by later progress reports and follow-up recommendations by the agencies concerned.

There is so much variation in the manner that the Planning Board's and the Council's basic procedures are applied to particular problems that it is difficult to attempt anything like a completely comprehensive account of them here. However, it is important to emphasize that, if the urgency of the situation requires it, many of the usual Planning Board and Council procedures can be foreshortened or altogether dispensed with. For example, if necessary a subject may be considered in the Council on the basis of oral presentation with little or no prior staff work.

The Operations Coordinating Board

Origin of the OCB. As indicated in the earlier discussion, the primary function of the Council machinery has been to provide policy advice to the President. It has not been itself involved in the implementation of policies. From the beginning of the Council's existence, when the President approved policies recommended to him by the Council, he directed that they be implemented by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies and he designated the department or agency which had primary responsibility for implementation as the coordinator. It was the responsibility of this coordinating agency to see that actions by other agencies to implement the policy were taken in a coordinated manner. In the defense mobilization field there was an established coordinating agency (at first the NSRB, then ODM, and now, the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization) with inter-departmental coordinating mechanisms and procedures. Similarly, after 1949 the internal security committees of the Council provided an organized means of effecting coordination of the implementation of the policies in this field. There were other cases where the problem of coordination hardly arose because the responsibility for implementation resided almost entirely in a single agency.

The coordination problems were most difficult with respect to the policies dealing with international affairs which constituted a majority of the policies recommended to the President through the Council. As has been indicated, the normal procedure was to designate the Department of State as the coordinating agency for such policies though their implementation almost invariably involved action by a number of other agencies of the government as well. In order to deal with this problem, responsibility for coordination was sometimes assigned jointly to State and another agency. Such arrangements were, however, of an ad hoc character and as of January 1953 there was no regular, established interdepartmental mechanism directly charged by the President with broad responsibility for coordinating the implementation of policies dealing with international affairs.

This problem received new attention as a result of the establishment by President Eisenhower, on January 24, 1953, of the "President's Committee on International Information Activities" to make a survey and evaluation of the international information policies and activities of the Executive Branch and of policies and activities related thereto, with particular reference to the international relations and national security of the United States. The Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. William H. Jackson, made its report to the President on June 30, 1953.* General recommendations of the report were released publicly on July 8, 1953.**

* Other members of the committee were Robert Cutler, Gordon Gray, Barklie McKee Henry, John C. Hughes, C.D. Jackson, Roger M. Kyes and Sigurd Larmon.

** White House Press Release, July 8, 1953. Information on the contents of the report in this history (including the quotations below) is taken from that press release.

The Committee concluded that the existing Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) should be abolished because it was

"...founded upon the misconception that 'psychological activities' and 'psychological strategy' somehow exist apart from official policies and actions and can be dealt with independently by experts in this field. In reality there is a 'psychological' aspect or implication to every diplomatic, economic, or military policy and action. This implication should receive more careful attention, both in the planning and execution stage of policy, but not to the exclusion of other vital factors."

In its place, the Committee recommended the creation of an Operations Coordinating Board within the NSC structure. The principal function of the new Board, which would consist of agency representatives at the Under Secretary level, would be the coordination and development by departments and agencies of detailed operational plans to carry out national security policies. This recommendation, it was stated, was designed "to achieve better integrated direction of the program of the United States in the world struggle and to fill the gap which has existed in the past between the formulation of general objectives and the detailed actions needed to give effect to them."

On July 2, 1953, the NSC considered these recommendations and referred them to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, for preparation of a draft Executive Order. An Executive Order creating an Operations Coordinating Board and abolishing the Psychological Strategy Board was approved by the President on September 2, 1953.* It provided for an OCB membership of the Under Secretary of State (Chairman), the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, the Director of Central Intelligence and a representative of the President to be designated by the President. Heads of other agencies were to be invited to send a representative to OCB meetings when the OCB was dealing with matters bearing directly on their responsibilities. The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs might attend any meeting of the Board and the Director, USIA, was to advise the Board at its request. The Executive Order provided for the creation of a staff and for the appointment of an Executive Officer for the Board.

The functions of the Board were stated as follows by Section 2 of the Executive Order:

"The National Security Council having recommended a national security policy and the President having approved it, the Board shall (1) whenever the President shall hereafter so direct, advise with the agencies concerned as to (a) their detailed operational planning responsibilities respecting such policy, (b) the coordination of the interdepartmental aspects of the detailed operational plans developed by the agencies to carry out such policy, (c) the timely and coordinated execution of such

* Executive Order 10483

policy and plans, and (d) the execution of each security action or project so that it shall make its full contribution to the attainment of national security objectives and to the particular climate of opinion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world, and (2) initiate new proposals for action within the framework of national security policies in response to opportunity and changes in the situation. The Board shall perform such other advisory functions as the President may assign to it and shall from time to time make reports to the National Security Council with respect to the carrying out of this order."

Though the Board was instructed to report to the NSC, it was not at this time placed within the structure of the NSC as recommended by the Jackson Report.

In essence, the OCB was to provide a regular means through which the responsible agencies could consult and coordinate their actions under approved national security policies or with respect to other operational matters of common concern not specifically related to a particular policy assigned to the Board. The OCB was to "advise with" the agencies; it had no power to direct action. It was to operate by agreements, and agreements reached in the Board would be implemented by each member of the Board through appropriate action within his own agency. The provision that the membership of the Board should be at the Under Secretary level was designed to ensure that the Board members would have sufficient authority within their respective agencies to direct the implementation of agreements reached within the Board. In this manner the coordinated implementation of policies was to be achieved without interposing the OCB between the President and the heads of the executive departments and agencies.

In practice, though it was not so specified in the Executive Order, the OCB was limited to policies dealing with international affairs or having an international affairs aspect, and was specifically excluded by the Executive Order from two fields in which coordinating mechanisms already existed - the fields of internal security and defense mobilization. Initially OCB was assigned coordinating responsibility for only those national security policies relating to international affairs which were approved by the President following the issuance of the Executive Order. As new policies were approved by the President and as existing policies were transferred to it, the OCB came to be the designated coordinator for the bulk of Presidentially-approved national security policies since the majority of such policies relate to international affairs. In addition, the OCB assumed responsibility for all PSB projects. After a review of them, it retained and completed work upon the majority of current PSB projects while dropping others. In accordance with the Executive Order, the OCB also developed additional projects of its own under the "climate of opinion" provision and under its authority to initiate new proposals for action within the existing framework of national security policies.

Organization of the OCB. The basic pattern of OCB organization was set during the first month or two following the issuance of the Executive Order and has changed very little since that time. It is a three-level interagency organization - consisting of the Board itself, the OCB Assistants (or "Board Assistants" as they are commonly called) and the OCB Working Groups - assisted at all levels by the OCB Staff. The basic types of reports and plans developed by the Board during these first months have continued to the present day, though the content of these documents has undergone a number of changes during the period.

Standing and ad hoc OCB working groups or committees have existed since the beginning of OCB and, in fact, can be traced back to antecedents in the inter-agency "panels" of the Psychological Strategy Board. When the President designates the OCB as coordinator for a national security policy, that policy is referred to an existing working group or, if such a working group does not exist, to a new working group created for the purpose. The working groups are composed of responsible operating officials from the agencies concerned with the implementation of the policy and a representative from the OCB Staff.* The agency which has chief responsibility - usually State - chairs the group. Agencies which do not regularly participate in the activities of the Board but which have implementation responsibilities in connection with a particular policy (e. g., Commerce or Labor) may be regular participants at the working group level. The working groups have essentially two functions: (a) to provide a regular mechanism at the working level for consulting and for coordinating actions to implement national security policies or actions on other matters of mutual concern, and (b) to prepare reports (periodic or special) and operations plans for consideration by the Board.

Each Board member is assisted by a Board Assistant, an individual from the Board member's agency whose rank is such as to give him direct access to the principal operating officials in his agency. The OCB Assistants were not specifically provided for in the Executive Order, but were designated by the OCB at the first OCB meeting on September 17, 1953, and began meeting together as a group under the chairmanship of the Board's Executive Officer shortly thereafter. Individually, the OCB Assistants provide staff support for their respective Board members, assist them in intradepartmental and interdepartmental cooperation on subjects dealt with by the Board, and aid their agency's working group members in meeting OCB requirements. As a group, the OCB Assistants meet once each week to review papers prepared (in the usual case by the working groups) for Board consideration to ensure that they are ready for Board consideration; they seek to ensure that these papers are adequate and that they accurately reflect any differences of view among the agencies. The OCB Assistants may, in some cases, also act on behalf of their principals when they consider that they have the authority to do so and when the Executive Officer concurs in such a procedure.

* Agency representation on the working groups is approximately at the desk officer level, though the designated chairmen are usually Office Directors or Deputy Office Directors from the State Department and during periods when particularly significant or critical problems are under consideration may be of even higher level.

No changes have been made in the prescribed functions of the OCB since the issuance of the original Executive Order, but a number of changes have occurred in participation and membership. The Director, USIA, was added to the Board's membership by Executive Order on February 28, 1955.* Up to that time he had regularly attended OCB meetings as an Observer. When the Foreign Operations Administration was abolished by statute effective on June 30, 1955, the membership of the Director, FOA, on the OCB was also abolished. An Executive Order issued at this time provided, however, that the Director of the new International Cooperation Administration or his representative should "participate in the deliberations, and assist with the affairs of" the OCB.** Pursuant to this authority and by agreement of the Board, the Director, ICA, participated with the Board in an informal status as an adviser until July 1, 1957, when a revised Executive Order made him a Member.*** During this entire period ICA representatives participated regularly in the work of the OCB Assistants and Working Groups. By decision of the President, the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament participated during the period 1955-58 in OCB meetings when matters of interest to the Disarmament Staff were under consideration.

By action of the OCB on March 13, 1957, following a general review by it of arrangements with respect to participation, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, the Under Secretary of the Treasury and the Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget, became "Standing-Request" members of the OCB.**** Standing-Request members are authorized to participate in the work of the OCB to the extent that they consider desirable. In practice these three agencies have participated in differing degrees at the three interdepartmental levels of the OCB organization. Treasury representatives are full participants at all levels. The Chairman, AEC, regularly attends the informal weekly luncheon meetings of the OCB. AEC representatives attend formal OCB meetings and Board Assistants meetings only when a subject of interest to AEC is to be considered and AEC is represented only on those working groups in which it has a direct interest. Budget does not attend OCB luncheon meetings, usually attends formal OCB meetings in an observer status, but is a full participant at the Board Assistants and working group levels.

At the time of the issuance of the Executive Order creating the OCB the President designated his Special Assistant for Cold War Planning as his representative on the OCB.***** Initially the primary responsibility of

* Executive Order 10598

** Executive Order 10610, Section 303 (b).

*** Executive Order 10700, Section 1 (b).

**** Prior to March 1957 AEC and Treasury had for some time been frequent participants in OCB meetings under the provision of the Executive Order with respect to participation by non-member agencies. Treasury and Budget had been participating in the work of the OCB Assistants and of many of the working groups.

***** Officials who held the position of President's representative (and Special Assistant to the President) through 1956 were C. D. Jackson (Special Assistant from February 1953 and the President's representative from September 1953 - March 1954); Nelson A. Rockefeller (December 1954 - December 1955); William H. Jackson (March 1956 - December 1956).

this Presidential representative lay in the "climate of opinion" area referred to in the Executive Order establishing the Board. The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs also attended all OCB meetings and was a full participant in its activities.*

The creation of the OCB and the assignment to it of operations coordinating functions had the effect of superseding the responsibilities for follow-up of the implementation of national security policies which had been assigned to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by the March 17, 1953, report on the NSC.** Nonetheless, something of this follow-up function continued to be performed by the President's representative on the Board. As the OCB evolved and as new Special Assistants occupied the position of President's representative, there was a gradual increase in emphasis upon the follow-up function of the President's representative and he became tied more closely to the normal activities of the OCB. This change received some formal recognition in May 1955 when the President's representative became Vice Chairman of the Board. During the fall of 1956 Mr. William H. Jackson, who was already a Special Assistant to the President and his representative on the OCB, also became Acting Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. When Mr. Robert Cutler resumed the position of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in January 1957 he temporarily assumed both of these roles. However, it was not until the changes of July 1957 (discussed below) that the functions of the President's representative were clearly restated to accord with the developing practice.

The OCB Staff. The Executive Order of September 1953 which established the OCB instructed the agencies represented on the Board to contribute to its financial support. Until Fiscal Year 1958 the OCB agencies contributed on an agreed-share basis to the OCB budget. State provided logistical support for the Board.

The Executive Order also authorized the OCB agencies to detail personnel to the OCB Staff. It was the policy of the OCB from the beginning, in the selection of its professional staff, to maintain a balance between permanent staff officers who provided continuity and staff officers on two to three year assignments from the OCB member agencies who contributed experience derived from personal contact with the operations of their respective agencies. For a short period the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Planning served as the Board's Acting Executive Officer. However, on November 4, 1953, Mr. Elmer B. Staats became the fulltime Executive Officer.

As initially organized in October 1953, the OCB Staff consisted essentially of four elements: (a) the Office of the Executive Officer and Deputy Executive Officer; (b) the Secretariat; (c) the Special Staff headed by an official who was also the Special Assistant for Intelligence; and (d) the Executive Assistant.

* The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs was represented on the OCB Assistants until 1957.

** Supra, pp. 33-34

The members of the secretariat unit provided executive secretaries for the working groups, contributed to drafting of documents by the working groups, provided substantive staff support to the Executive Officer on subjects within their areas of responsibility and generally facilitated the process by which OCB member agencies reached decisions with respect to implementing actions to carry out national security policies. In January 1954 this unit was reorganized on a geographical area basis and its members began reporting directly to the Executive Officer and his Deputy, rather than through a Chief of the Secretariat (a position which was abolished). They were made members of the working groups dealing with those national security policies for which they had responsibility and were designated the "OCB Staff Representative" on the working group instead of "Executive Secretary". This part of the OCB Staff is presently called the "Area Staff".

The Special Staff (later called the "Special Projects Staff") was established primarily to perform two functions: (a) to provide staff support to the President's representative on the Board and to carry out special assignments for him; and (b) to provide the President's representative and the Executive Officer current background information on foreign political, military, economic and social developments affecting implementation of national security policies. The importance of the former of these two functions gradually declined as the President's representative's role within the OCB changed to emphasize the "follow-up" function over the "climate of opinion" function. Accordingly, in January 1956 this unit was renamed the "Intelligence Liaison Staff" and its functions were largely limited to the second of the two functions described above.

The Executive Assistant was a general assistant to the Executive Officer, performed secretariat functions for the Board itself, maintained liaison with the NSC Staff and supervised administrative functions and certain reporting functions not performed by the working groups.

A reorganization of the OCB Staff in September 1954 added a "Communications Staff" with personnel drawn from other sections of the Staff. This unit, which was subsequently renamed the "Media Program Staff", and, still later, the "Information and Education Projects Staff", was concerned with OCB activities in the information, communications, education, cultural and ideological fields which cut across the geographical organization of the Area Staff. It was a "functional" staff.

To sum up, the OCB Staff organization at the beginning of 1957 included the following elements: (a) the Office of the Executive Officer and the Deputy Executive Officer; (b) the Office of the Executive Assistant; (c) the Area Staff; (d) the Information and Education Projects Staff; and (e) the Intelligence Liaison Staff.

Placement of the OCB within the NSC Structure. On February 25, 1957, the President issued a revised Executive Order formally placing the OCB

within the structure of the National Security Council as of July 1, 1957.* After well over three years of activity the OCB had proved its value; the time had therefore come to place it on a more permanent footing and to establish "a closer relation between the formulation and the carrying out of security policies."** In addition, the order added ICA to the membership of the Board (as already noted), changed the arrangements with respect to the chairmanship and Vice chairmanship of the OCB, and affected the relationship of the OCB Staff to the NSC Staff.*** Whereas the earlier order had provided that the Under Secretary of State would be chairman of the Board, the new order stated that the President would appoint the chairman and vice chairman from among the members of the Board. The President, at the time of the issuance of the order, appointed Mr. Christian A. Herter, the then Under Secretary of State, as Chairman and Mr. Robert Cutler, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, as Vice Chairman. However, in May 1957, upon the recommendation of his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the President established a new position, that of Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination. The President appointed Mr. Frederick M. Dearborn to the new position.**** He designated Mr. Dearborn Vice Chairman of the OCB and his principal representative on the OCB. The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs continued as a second representative of the President on the OCB. The new Special Assistant's functions were much more closely tied to the normal operation of the OCB mechanism than had been true in the case of previous Special Assistants who had served as the President's representative on the OCB. Thus, his duties included, in addition to serving as Vice Chairman and participating in the meetings of the OCB: (a) consulting with the OCB Executive Officer as to the agenda and scheduling of work for OCB meetings; (b) collaborating with the Chairman and the OCB Executive Officer to assure the effective functioning of the Operations Coordinating Board; (c) developing for OCB consideration new proposals for action within the framework of national security policies in response to opportunity and changes in the situation; (d) attending Council meetings and presenting thereat OCB reports; (e) attending and participating in, as appropriate, meetings of the NSC Planning Board, of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, and other relevant groups;***** (f) maintaining close liaison with the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs; and (g) such other assignments related to security operations coordination as the President might direct. In performing all of these duties he was to act in close collaboration with the Chairman of the OCB. Following Congressional action creating a second

* Executive Order 10700

** Quotation from White House Press Release, February 25, 1957

*** The effect of the Order on the NSC and OCB Staffs is discussed in the next major section below.

**** Following Mr. Dearborn's death on February 25, 1958, Mr. Karl G. Harr was appointed Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination.

***** The Special Assistant became a Planning Board Adviser. At this time the OCB Adviser to the Planning Board was eliminated. The Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination also attends meetings of the Cabinet and of the National Aeronautics and Space Council.

Under Secretary of State, the President, on September 16, 1959, designated Mr. Robert D. Murphy, the new Under Secretary for Political Affairs, as Chairman of the OCB. When Mr. Murphy resigned the chairmanship in connection with his retirement from government service, the President, on January 13, 1960, designated Mr. Gordon Gray, his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, as chairman. In taking this action the President stated in a letter to Mr. Gray:

"In view of your continuing responsibility as the principal supervisory officer of the work of the National Security Council in formulating national security policies including those assigned by me to the OCB for coordination, you are in a position to provide impartial and objective guidance and leadership to the Board. This new assignment is one step which I feel should be taken toward enabling the President to look to one office for staff assistance in the whole range of national security affairs."*

In a letter to his Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination, Mr. Karl G. Harr, on the same day the President assigned Mr. Harr special responsibility in two areas of the Board's work: (a) taking the lead in initiating new proposals to the Board for actions within the framework of national security policies in response to opportunity and changes in the situation; and (b) seeing that Board actions contribute fully to the climate of foreign opinion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world.** This assignment constituted reaffirmation of the President's desire that these two aspects of the OCB's activities receive fullest possible attention in the implementation of national security policy.

The Work of the OCB. The OCB meets at 1:00 p. m. every Wednesday. The first hour and a quarter is an informal luncheon meeting to which designated members only are regularly invited. At the luncheon meeting members bring up any matters that they consider appropriate. There is no agenda although frequently members of the Board give advance notice of topics they wish discussed. No minutes are kept for these meetings. The Executive Officer is the only staff officer who attends the luncheon meetings.

Board discussions at the luncheon meeting are rarely conducted on the basis of staff papers. Rather, the luncheons serve as an extremely valuable means by which the OCB members consult informally as ranking government officials with respect to important matters of mutual concern within the wide range of the Board's interests. This activity is thus distinguished from the more formal part of the Board's work which is concerned in large measure with discussion, revision and approval of written documents such as Operations Plans and reports.

Agreements may be reached during the luncheon on some of the matters discussed, others are referred to the appropriate working group for study and later recommendations, and still others are referred to the agencies

* White House Press Release, January 13, 1960

** Ibid.

concerned for decision outside the OCB framework. The Executive Officer records the Board's actions and later advises the interested agencies of them.

Items on the OCB agenda are discussed at the formal session which is convened at 2:15 p. m. As indicated previously, OCB documents prepared by the working groups are usually presented to the Board only after they have been reviewed by the OCB Assistants. Usually the Chairman of the working group which has prepared a particular document (and in many instances an Assistant Secretary from the same agency) attends the Board meeting to answer questions and to report on developments which have occurred since the document was prepared.

The Board members discuss and settle or agree on a method for seeking settlement of all differences of view contained in the document under consideration. As previously indicated, the OCB always acts by "agreement" or "concurrence"; it does not "decide" or "direct". Action on a document therefore consists in concurring in it and agreeing to carry out any actions it contains. When there is a difference of view among the OCB members which cannot be resolved within the OCB itself, it is referred to the respective agency heads. If they cannot resolve the difference, it may be taken to the President for resolution, sometimes directly, but normally through the NSC.

The agenda, which is determined by the Board upon the recommendation of the Executive Officer, includes the following principal types of documents: (a) operations plans for foreign countries or regions or major "functional" areas; (b) reports to the NSC on assigned policies; (c) semiannual appraisals of the validity of assigned policies and evaluations of their implementation; (d) the Activity Report and other standing items (such as the minutes of the previous meeting); (e) special reports for the OCB or the NSC prepared by OCB working groups to meet specific needs for information or action; and (f) oral reports which may serve as background briefings for papers on the agenda or as the basis for discussion of current problems of major interest. It is impossible to generalize about the last two types of report because their character is determined by the special needs which give rise to their preparation. However, the first four types of report have a history of development which is summarized below.

When the President, after approving a national security policy, assigns it to OCB to coordinate implementation, the Board requests the working group which has responsibility for the foreign country or area to prepare Operations Plans for each country. Such Plans are comprehensive, detailed outlines of operating guidance to implement a policy.

Initially the working groups had carried out their coordinating responsibilities directly under the policy. In September 1954, however, following suggestions by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director, Foreign Operations Administration, the OCB Assistants agreed, on behalf of their principals, to initiate preparation of Operations Plans. Their purpose,

as stated in 1954, was to provide a means by which the Board would review the working group's agreement as to basic approach, emphasis, timing and agency action responsibilities under the policy.

The Plans were, and continue to be, prepared by the working groups on the basis of material submitted by the responsible agencies. Under the original instructions approved in 1954 the Operations Plan* contained two basic elements: (a) a statement of basic approach which indicated the concept of operations; and (b) a statement of actions agreed upon, agency responsibilities for implementation, and timing of actions. In addition the Plan included annexes listing for consideration by the Board: (a) desirable actions which had not been included because of policy, funding or other limitations;** and (b) proposed actions on which there was not agreement between the agencies. Those proposals in the annexes in which the Board concurred were included in the final agreed Plan, the rest were eliminated from the Plan.

During the following two years a financial annex and a statement of major U. S. commitments (financial, military and political) with respect to the country were added. In July 1957 agreed courses of action based upon the courses of action in the policy paper were eliminated in favor of statements of existing and projected agency programs. In making this latter change, the Board made the OCB Assistants and the working groups specifically responsible for assuring that proposed agency programs fully reflected the national security policy objectives and courses of action.

In the course of a general review by the OCB of its reports in the spring and summer of 1959, following issuance of the new Presidential instructions on reporting, the format and content of Operations Plans was also reviewed. The plans now contain two major sections: (a) a section containing objectives and major policy directives; and (b) a section containing operational guidance. This latter section consists of a series of paired paragraphs, the first of which states a problem; this problem statement is followed by one or more paragraphs of operational guidance. There may be "splits" in these sections when the Plan goes to the Board. Following the main body of the plan are annexes containing: (a) a statement of arrangements or agreements between the country concerned and the United States; (b) statements of the agency programs for carrying out the plan prepared by the agencies responsible for the programs; (c) financial data on U. S. assistance and other programs in the country concerned; and frequently (d) an estimate of Sino-Soviet activities and intentions with respect to that country.

* Initially called "Outline Plans of Operations"

** This annex was later supplanted by a listing, on a selective basis, of additional proposals under consideration in the working group which appeared to be outside existing policy.

Preparation of an Operations Plan helps to identify, clarify and resolve differences of policy interpretation, operating responsibility, or required actions. It also exposes operating difficulties and recommends practical guidance for the more effective implementation of the policy. The approved Plan is designed to provide useful guidance for agency operations in Washington and in the field, with particular reference to those activities that are of interagency character and that require interagency coordination. Before a draft Plan is completed, interested diplomatic missions abroad are asked to comment upon it. When the Board has concurred in a Plan, it is sent by the State Department to the appropriate Chiefs of Mission abroad and by Defense to the appropriate unified commands. Copies or appropriate extracts are provided by other Washington agencies to their field representatives. A Plan is subject to review at any time and may be modified to meet changed circumstances. All Plans are formally reviewed, and revised as necessary, every six months.

What are called by the OCB "Reports to the NSC" are the current form of progress reports on policies assigned to the OCB for coordination. A September 9, 1953, NSC instruction on progress reports confirmed the existing NSC directive that Progress Reports should contain two elements: (a) a summary of significant actions taken to implement the policy; and (b) an evaluation of the effectiveness, timeliness and applicability of the policy. This instruction indicated that the "appropriate interval" for the submission of reports would be three to six months. A May 11, 1954, amendment to the instructions gave the coordinating agency authority to determine the appropriate interval. These general instructions still govern the content, though not the form or frequency, of progress reports.

The first OCB instruction on the subject, dated April 30, 1954, provided that progress reports should be submitted every six months unless otherwise specified. Initially the progress reports contained both a summary statement of significant actions taken to implement the policy and a more detailed treatment keyed, on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis, to the policy. Later this detailed treatment was dropped and by September 15, 1955, OCB reports contained three major sections: (a) a listing of major developments during the period; (b) a summary statement of operating progress in relationship to major NSC objectives (including recommendations on the need for policy review); and (c) major problems or areas of difficulty. A financial annex was attached to the report. Reports continued to include these same elements until 1959, although changes in format gave increasing emphasis to the "major problems" section.

Until January 1959 reports were ordinarily submitted to the Council every six months, though there were cases of both more and less frequent reporting. On January 29, 1959, the President directed that progress reports normally be transmitted at yearly intervals unless the coordinating agency considered that there were significant developments affecting the policy or wished to recommend a review. The President's January directive was superseded on July 29, 1959, by a new directive which required each coordinating agency to continue to reappraise the validity and evaluate the implementation of policy, as required by developments or periodically, normally at six-month intervals. It eliminated the requirement for annual

reporting to the Council, stating instead that reports should be submitted whenever the coordinating agency wished to recommend a policy review or considered that there had been developments of such significance as to warrant a progress report. Both directives pointed out, in addition, that any Council Member or Adviser or the Planning Board could recommend review of a policy whenever developments were believed to justify it. The purpose of these directives was to eliminate routine reports to the Council and to concentrate the Council's time and attention on those cases where significant developments had occurred or where the policy appeared to need review. They also placed additional and significant responsibility upon the OCB itself for determining, through periodic (normally semi-annual) appraisals, the need for a report to the NSC.

As a result of these changes, the OCB made a general review of its reports. Under revised OCB instructions, evaluations of the validity and the implementation of assigned policies continue to be prepared periodically (normally semi-annually) by the working groups for the Board. These semi-annual appraisals become reports to the Council only when the Board determines that developments or the need for policy review justify such action. In view of the new focus of the reports, the "major problems" section has been dropped, but, as indicated above, is now incorporated in the Operations Plans. The reports to the Council contain two sections: (a) a statement on the adequacy of the policy; and (b) a summary evaluation of progress in accomplishing U. S. objectives. The financial annex has been eliminated; as noted, such an annex is included in the Operations Plans.

OCB reports to the Council continue to be discussed in the Planning Board prior to the Council meeting. The Council notes or discusses the report and acts upon any recommendation for policy review. If it determines that such review is necessary, it directs the Planning Board to undertake it.

Since October 21, 1953, an important item on the agenda of every OCB meeting has been the weekly "Activity Report." The report presently contains the following types of information: (a) follow-up on Board actions or matters discussed at Board meetings; (b) significant developments related to major operating problems described in the latest plan or report; (c) significant matters considered at the meetings of the Board Assistants or working groups and committees; (d) schedules of pending OCB papers; and (e) new assignments to the OCB with follow-up plans for coordination. Substantially the present format, which is organized on a geographical area basis and seeks to relate the report closely to OCB activities, was adopted in March 1956. The Report is prepared by the Executive Officer with the assistance of the OCB Staff (more particularly the OCB Staff Representatives on the working groups and committees). It is based upon current material obtained primarily from the OCB agencies but due to time limitations is not formally cleared in advance with them. The Report helps keep OCB Members informed of current developments relating to the work of the OCB and discussion of the report in the OCB may result (for example) in agreement to request a report, to take action, or to follow-up on actions previously taken.

Changes in the NSC Staff Since July 1, 1957

The Executive Order of February 25, 1957 brought the OCB Staff within the NSC Staff, effective July 1, 1957. In anticipation of this action the offices of the OCB Staff were moved into the Executive Office Building in space adjacent to the offices of the NSC Staff and the two Special Assistants. A single NSC budget for fiscal year 1958, including funds for both the NSC and the OCB, was presented to Congress in January; upon its approval the OCB Staff was for the first time financed directly by a Congressional appropriation for the NSC rather than indirectly through contributions from OCB constituent agencies.

The revised Executive Order had three major effects upon the NSC and OCB Staffs: (a) it integrated the staffs, making them into a single NSC Staff headed by the Executive Secretary of the NSC; (b) it provided for close liaison between members of the staffs and for better correlation of the staff work for the NSC and the OCB; and (c) it permitted the consolidation of certain administrative services for both staffs in the interests of economy and efficiency. The specific effects of the reorganization upon staff organization can best be illustrated by a description of the present organization of the new NSC Staff in the course of which changes will be indicated.

The first major unit within the NSC Staff is the Office of the Executive Secretary. The NSC Executive Secretary, as has been noted, acts for the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in his absence (including acting as Chairman of the Planning Board)* and advises and aids him in the performance of his duties. He continues to be responsible for the over-all supervision of the NSC Staff, to supervise directly the staff services for the Council itself, and to give general direction to the Policy Coordinating Staff and the Administrative Office. The Administrative Office, headed by an Administrative Officer, was created on July 1, 1957, as a part of the Office of the Executive Secretary to perform for the entire NSC Staff certain personnel, budget, fiscal, supply and general services and records, reproduction, courier and related services. The Administrative Office maintains liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency which continues to perform certain supporting administrative services on a reimbursable basis for the entire NSC Staff.

A second major unit of the NSC Staff is the Policy Coordinating Staff, headed by the NSC Deputy Executive Secretary.** This Staff is comprised of two elements: (a) the Policy Coordinating Special Staff; and (b) the Planning

* The Executive Secretary does not act for the Special Assistant in his role as Chairman of the OCB. That function is performed by the Vice Chairman of the OCB.

** Mr. S. Everett Gleason, who had been Deputy Executive Secretary of the NSC since March 6, 1950, left the NSC Staff on August 16, 1959, and was replaced as Deputy Executive Secretary by Mr. Marion W. Boggs.

Board Secretariat. The principal functions of the Special Staff continue to be to (a) assist the Special Assistant and the Executive Secretary by preparation for them of an independent analysis and review of each Planning Board report at each stage in its preparation; (b) assist the Special Assistant by preparation of drafts of the briefing notes used by him in presenting policy papers to the Council; (c) perform staff work in connection with the Special Assistant's membership on other interdepartmental bodies;* (d) seek to determine whether gaps exist in national security policies and whether the policy implications of current or anticipated developments are being explored; (e) provide NSC Staff representation on ad hoc Council or Planning Board committees; and (f) assist in the preparation of the annual status reports on national security programs. The Planning Board Secretariat continues to perform secretariat functions for the Planning Board, and its Director serves as chairman of the Planning Board Assistants. The Deputy Executive Secretary, in addition to heading the Policy Coordinating Staff, acts for the Executive Secretary in his absence, advises and aids him in the performance of his duties, and is directly responsible for Council secretariat activities.

The third major unit in the NSC Staff is the OCB Staff, headed by the Executive Officer of the OCB.** On July 1, 1957, when the OCB Staff was brought within the NSC Staff, it continued to consist of five elements: (a) the Office of the Executive Officer and Deputy Executive Officer; (b) the OCB Secretariat (formerly the Office of the Executive Assistant); (c) the Area Staff; (d) the Information and Education Projects Staff (recently renamed the Information, Education and Special Projects Staff); and (e) the Intelligence Liaison Staff.

In addition to heading the OCB Staff, the Executive Officer is chairman of the OCB Assistants. He serves the Board as its principal staff officer, providing impartial and confidential staff work and advice for the Board and for the agencies involved in OCB activities. He is expected to bring to the attention of the Board any matter that, in his judgment, should receive its consideration. He is responsible for the organization of necessary staff work for the Board, for obtaining the assistance of non-member agencies in work on Board projects, and for ensuring that qualified personnel are assigned by all agencies to such staff work. Through general supervision of the work of the working groups, he seeks to ensure that they carry out their assigned functions and that documents prepared by them are responsive to the needs of the Board both as to timing and as to substance.

* The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs is a member of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy and may attend Cabinet meetings. He is authorized to attend the meetings of certain other bodies of a standing character such as the National Aeronautics and Space Council and the Federal Council for Science and Technology. He is also from time to time a member of various ad hoc committees and groups.

** Mr. Elmer B. Staats resigned as Executive Officer September 12, 1958, and was replaced by Mr. Bromley Smith on January 1, 1959.

The OCB Secretariat under a Director who is also Executive Assistant to the Executive Officer performs secretariat functions for the OCB and the OCB Assistants and assists in the administration of the OCB Staff. The members of the OCB Area Staff and the Information, Education and Special Projects Staff, under the supervision of the Executive Officer and the Deputy Executive Officer, serve as members of working groups to which they are assigned, contributing to the drafting of documents, preparation of agenda and minutes, and identification of problems requiring interagency coordination; select information for inclusion in the weekly Activity Report; and help identify opportunities for psychological exploitation. Since the OCB Intelligence Liaison Staff has recently been absorbed into a new NSC Staff unit, it will be dealt with separately below.

Until July 1, 1957, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs had a representative on the OCB Assistants who participated as a member of that group and who assisted the Special Assistant in the performance of his OCB membership functions.* This representative was a member of the NSC Special Staff. In connection with the creation of the position of Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination, and the placing of the OCB Staff within the NSC Staff, the separate representation of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs on the OCB Assistants was eliminated. Since July 1, 1957, staff support for both Special Assistants in their OCB work has been provided by the OCB Staff. This arrangement was continued when the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs became chairman of the OCB. Members of the Policy Coordinating Special Staff may, however, attend OCB Assistants meetings as observers for items of interest to them and OCB Staff members enjoy similar rights with respect to Planning Board and Planning Board Assistants meetings. The new organizational association, as well as the physical location of the Policy Coordinating and OCB Staffs together, has increased markedly the exchange of information and ideas between them.

The fourth major unit of the NSC Staff is the Internal Security Coordinating Staff, headed by a Director who is also the NSC Representative on Internal Security.** In addition to performing the internal security functions of the latter office, the Director now provides staff analysis, advice and assistance on behalf of the NSC Staff in connection with the responsibilities of the NSC for issuing general directives for the purpose of organizing and coordinating the foreign intelligence activities of the several agencies of the government. He also performs on assignment the functions of a Policy Coordinating Special Staff member with respect to certain policies and programs.

* Except for a brief period, the Special Assistant who was the President's representative on the OCB did not have a representative on the OCB Assistants. Staff support for the President's representative was provided by the Executive Officer of the OCB and the OCB Staff.

** Mr. J. Patrick Coyne continues to hold this position.

The fifth and final unit of the NSC Staff is the Research and Intelligence Liaison Staff. The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in early January 1960 arranged for a study of research in relationship to national security policy. The Planning Board, after discussion of the results of this study, agreed that a unit should be established within the NSC Staff to serve as a clearing house on research on national security problems being done inside and outside the Government. The Planning Board did not believe that enough was known about the adequacy of such research and about whether there are serious gaps in research coverage to justify action beyond the creation of such a clearing house unit at this time.

The President approved the creation of such a clearing house. The new unit was created, effective June 1, 1960, by abolishing the OCB Intelligence Liaison Staff and creating a new "Research and Intelligence Liaison Staff" under a Director with the following functions: (a) keeping the NSC Planning Board, the Operations Coordinating Board, the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination and other components of the NSC Staff informed of research being done within and outside the Government which has significant bearing upon their responsibilities for national security policy-making or operations coordination; (b) facilitating appropriate access within the Government to such research; and (c) in cooperation with intelligence and other NSC participating agencies, obtaining or developing intelligence and other background information needed by the NSC Staff and the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination.*

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* The OCB Intelligence Liaison Staff, while continuing formally to be a part of the OCB Staff, had, in fact, for some time served the Policy Coordinating Staff as well as the OCB Staff. The Director of the new Staff is Mr. Neilson C. Debevoise who was formerly Chief of the OCB Intelligence Liaison Staff.

The foregoing history indicates three fundamental organizational attributes which appear to be required for the effective functioning of the National Security Council:

1. Ready adaptability of the organization to the particular needs and desires of each President during the course of each Administration.
2. Well-established organizational structure and procedures which are thoroughly understood by officials who participate regularly in the work of the Council.
3. Sufficient flexibility as to the manner and timing of the use of the organization to enable each project to be handled in accordance with its particular character and urgency.

Experience since its creation in 1947 has shown that the National Security Council, when organized with the above attributes, is a valuable instrumentality for providing the President integrated advice on policies required for the Nation's security.